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I. INTRODUCTION
It is now largely recognized that the multinational enterprise
("MNE") can play a significant role in the industrialization of a number
of different countries.1 The major way in which the MNE can contribute
toward the industrialization of a country is through foreign direct invest-
ment ("FDI"). To induce such MNE investment, several host countries
1 Several studies have identified the potential of the MNE in the development of host countries.
See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS ("UNCTC"), TRANSNA-
TIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT: A RE-EXAMINATION (1978); UNITED NA-
TIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD
DEVELOPMENT: THIRD SURVEY, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/46 (1983) [hereinafter UNCTC, THIRD SUR-
VEY]; Hymer, The Multinational Corporation and the Law of Unevendevelopment, in ECONOMIcS
AND WORLD ORDER: FROM THE 1970s TO THE 1990s (J. Bhagwati ed. 1972). See also THE MUL-
TINATIONAL CORPORATION IN THE 1980s (C. Kindleberger & D. Audretsch eds. 1983); R.
VERNON, STORM OVER THE MULTINATIONALS: THE REAL ISSUES (1977) [hereinafter R.
VERNON, STORM]; G. REUBER, PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPMENT (1973). More
recent indications of the belief in the potential of MNEs to affect the development of host countries
can be found in the United States' encouragement of foreign direct investment ("FDI") in the Carib-
bean Basin Region.
The commitment of the Reagan Administration to encouraging United States foreign investors
to invest in the Caribbean Basin Region was well articulated by President Reagan; see Caribbean
Basin Initiative, Address Before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States
("OAS"), 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 217 (Feb. 24, 1982). See also Caribbean Basin Initiative
Legislation, Statement by the President, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 240 (Feb. 16, 1983); Carib-
bean Basin Initiative, Remarks to Ambassadors of Member Nations of the OAS, 18 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1655 (Dec. 22, 1982). See also H.R. 6715, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. 3968
(1982)-a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to allow a credit against income tax for
the use of certain forms of business insurance for new business activities in designated Caribbean
countries.
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have relied significantly on fiscal incentives in general and tax incentives
in particular for over half a century. However, after several decades, the
effects of these tax incentives on the motivation of MNEs to invest in
incentive granting countries continues to be the focus of a heated debate.
While some believe that tax incentives do actually motivate MNE invest-
ment behavior,4 others believe that such motivational effects are either
2 Several studies have discussed host countries' tax incentives laws and policies. See, eg.,
Kopits, Effects of Tax Changes on Direct Investment Abroad, in UNITED STATES TAXATION AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 223 (R. Hellawell ed. 1980); Patrick, U.S. Tax Treaties With Developing
Countries, in UNITED STATES TAXATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 307 (R. Hellawell, ed.
1980) (There are several other interesting discussions of this subject in this book.) See also R.
GROSSE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT CODES AND THE LOCATION OF DIRECT INVESTMENT (1980); R.
ANTHOINE, TAX INCENTIVES FOR PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1979);
TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, TAX INCENTIVES (1971); Adler, U.S. Taxation of US. Multinational
Corporations: A Manual of Computation Techniques and Managerial Decision Rules, in 2 INTERNA-
TIONAL FINANCE AND TRADE 157 (M. Sarnat & G. Szeg6 eds. 1979); Surrey, International Tax
Conventions: How They Operate and What They Accomplish, 23 J. TAX'N 364 (1965); Surrey, Tax
Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government
Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970); Patrick, U.S. Tax Policy and Foreign Investments-
Legislative and Treaty Issues, 5 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1975). For other studies on national
tax legislation and the FDI process, see also UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL COR-
PORATIONS, NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS RELATING TO TRANSNATIONAL CORPO-
RATIONS, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/26 (1983) [hereinafter UNCTC, NATIONAL LEGISLATION].
3 See, e.g., D. HARTMAN, DOMESTIC TAX POLICY AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT: SOME EVI-
DENCE (National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Working Papers Series, Working Paper No.
784, 1981); Hartman, The Effects of Taxing Foreign Investment Income, 13 J. PUB. ECON. 213
(1980); Hartman, Tax Policy and Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 37 NAT'L TAX J.
475 (1984); Batra & Ramachandran, Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade and
Investment, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 278 (1980); Shah & Toye, Fiscal Incentives for Firms in Some
Developing Countries: Survey and Critique, in TAXATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 279-80
(J. Toye ed. 1978). For a recent study on the determinants of FDI, see Schneider & Frey, Economic
and Policital Determinants of Foreign Direct Investments, 13 WORLD DEV. 161 (1985).
4 See, e.g., Hartke, A Foreign Trade and Investment Policy for the 1970s, in AMERICAN LABOR
AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION 54 (D. Kujawa ed. 1973), where he had the following to
say about U.S. tax policies:
Tax Policies-U.S. tax policies have been designed to encourage the outflow of U.S. capital at
the expense of domestic investment....
Our present tax laws create an attractive tax shelter for any income earned abroad by a
U.S. corporation. Income earned in the United States is ordinarily taxed in the year when
earned. Under our tax laws, however, income earned abroad is never taxed until it is brought
home to the States. The unregulated U.S. transnational is in the position of earning capital in
the United States, investing that capital overseas, and never paying a dime in U.S. taxes on any
income earned abroad.
Even if the profits are brought back to the United States, existing tax law permits the U.S.
corporation to take a dollar for dollar credit against domestic federal tax liability for any income
taxes paid abroad. The domestic corporation that has chosen to invest in Indiana must pay
state taxes and cannot take them as a credit against its federal income tax liability.
Id. at 59 (emphasis in original).
See also Goldfinger, An American Trade Union View of International Trade and Investment, in
AMERICAN LABOR AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION, supra, at 28, where he presents the
proposals of the AFL-CIO to include the following:
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negligible or nonexistent.5 This debate is hardly a trivial matter because
whether MNEs are motivated or not by tax incentives has important im-
plications for labor, business, and government policy of home countries.
The current debate over the runaway plant in the United States6
assumes the efficacy of tax incentives. If on the other hand, tax incen-
tives are not an effective means of attracting FDI, then countries inter-
ested in attracting MNE involvement in their local economies need to
adopt more appropriate policies. A policy is appropriate for these pur-
poses if it addresses the actual motivational factors in MNE foreign oper-
ations. In other words, an appropriate FDI incentive policy is one that is
closely tied to or derived from the theory of the MNE. The question,
then, is whether current tax incentive policies are appropriate.
For years, tax incentive policies have been based on the capital arbi-
trage theory of FDI.7 The capital arbitrage theory, however, is no longer
considered an adequate explanation of the FDI process. Consequently,
any incentive policies based on this theory are likely to be both misplaced
and ineffective. It is the purpose of this article to investigate possible
The U.S. government must stop helping and subsidizing U.S. companies in setting up and oper-
ating foreign subsidiaries.
Taxes on U.S. corporations' overseas operations are made to more closely relate to the tax
rules domestically.
Foreign operations of U.S. firms should carry the same load as their domestic operations.
Current U.S. tax provisions encourage movement abroad, even though $15 billion was spent in
1971 by U.S.-based firms in new plant and equipment outside the United States and a host of
technology transfers took place. These foreign investments have increased 60 per cent faster
than U.S. domestic investments in the past decade.
Id. at 49.
5 See, e-g., G. REUBER, supra note 1, at 120-28. For a general review and discussion on motiva-
tional affects, see also Stewart, Taxation and Technology Transfer, in CONTROLLING INTERNA-
TIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 137 (T. Sagafi-nejad, R. Moxon, & H. Perlmutter, eds. 1981)
[hereinafter CONTROLLING INT'L TECH. TRANSFER]; C. IRISH, INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXA-
TION AND AFRICAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (4 Stud. Tax'n & Econ. Dev. 1978).
6 See Goldfinger, supra note 4, at 49. For a more recent study of the concerns of American
labor unions, see Helfgott, American Unions and Multinational Companies: A Case of Misplaced
Emphasis, 18 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 81 (1983).
7 Traditionally, international capital mobility is explained by differential rates of return on capi-
tal as between countries. The theory states that capital will move from a capital rich country to a
capital scarce country in response to higher rates of return until such rates are equalized. The MNE
as an exporter of international capital is in a sense simply an arbitrager of capital. It pursues profits
by moving equity capital from countries with low rates of return to countries with high rates of
return. Thus, the profits made result from arbitrage activity. This is essentially a portfolio invest-
ment theory; it has been used to explain the motivation behind FDI. For a more extensive explana-
tion, see R. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 31-35 (1982)
[hereinafter R. CAVES, MULTNATIONAL ENTERPRISE]. The connection between differential rates of
return and differential tax rates as a motivation for FDI has been extensively explored elsewhere by
the author. See Yelpaala, The Efficacy of Tax Incentives Within the Framework of the Neoclassical
Theory of Foreign Direct Investment: A Legislative Policy Analysis, 19 TEx. INT'L L.J. 365, 371-73
(1984) [hereinafter Yelpaala, Efficacy of Tax Incentives].
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alternative incentive policies based on different theories of the FDI pro-
cess. Specifically, this article will analyze possible alternative and com-
plementary incentive policies under the intangible assets hypothesis,8 the
industrial organization theory, 9 and the internalization theory of FDI.'0
A. The Need for Reevaluation
The controversy over the MNE and the appropriate home and host
country policies has produced an interesting collection of opposing
views."1 Yet, to advocate a shift of focus from the current tax incentive
policies and laws to other policies requires some explanation. The utility
of tax incentive policies for attracting FDI has been doubted for years.
In a recent article this author questioned the theoretical basis of current
tax incentives, reviewed various studies on the subject, and concluded
that the theoretical basis for current tax incentive policies is flawed.12
Several reasons were offered for this conclusion. First, incentive granting
countries assume either explicitly or implicitly that there is some causal
relationship between differential tax rates and FDI. Several existing poli-
cies appear to have been induced by deductive logic from the neoclassical
international trade theory which inspired the capital arbitrage theory of
FDI.13 This theory established a spurious causal link between differen-
tial rates of return, differential tax rates, and the FDI process. 4 Second,
incentive granting countries assume that all FDI investors have a short-
term profit motive which can be induced by tax rate reductions. Third,
there is an assumption that the MNE parent and its units for foreign
operations would independently seek to maximize profits and deal with
each other at market prices.15 This article will demonstrate that these
assumptions cannot easily be supported by our knowledge of the charac-
teristic attributes and distinctive behavior of the MNE. Fourth, even if
tax incentives would motivate FDI activities, the existence of competitive
tax concessions given by host countries would tend to undermine their
effectiveness. 6 Fifth, tax incentives might not only be ineffective but
8 See infra notes 55-97 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 98-157 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 158-86 and accompanying text.
11 See infra note 26.
12 See Yelpaala, Efficacy of Tax Incentives, supra note 7, at 413.
13 Id at 373.
14 Id. at 379.
15 G. HARLEY, INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF THE INCOME TAX BASE OF MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISE 42-44 (1981), reprinted in International Division of the Income Tax Base of the Multina-
tional Enterprise: An Overview, 13 TAX NOTES 1563 (1981).
16 See Stewart, supra note 5, at 156.
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might also induce a reverse subsidy to capital-rich developed countries.
17
Sixth, several studies have stressed that tax incentives have been disre-
garded by MNEs because these incentives tend to be plagued by bureau-
cratic uncertainties. Finally, tax incentives are inefficient and costly.",
Notwithstanding these problems with tax incentives, several coun-
tries have continued to rely on the capital arbitrage theory of FDI as the
basis for FDI inducement policies. Indeed, there has been, in very recent
times, a proliferation of very liberal revisions of tax incentive laws by
several host developing countries. 9 Determined to maintain their indus-
trialization drive, newly-industrialized countries such as South Korea
and Taiwan have engaged in competitive liberal tax policies directed at
MNEs.20 In addition, middle- and low-income countries faced with the
growing need for technology transfer, capital, and managerial expertise
for industrial expansion, manufactured exports, and mineral extraction,
find themselves in strong competition for FDI with the more economi-
cally successful industrialized countries. As a result, they have also
found it necessary to further liberalize their tax incentives.21  In a re-
markable reversal of economic policies, even the People's Republic of
China has hopped on the bandwagon of countries seeking foreign capital
and MNE involvement through tax incentives.22 The theoretical basis
17 See Yelpaala, Efficacy of Tax Incentives, supra note 7, at 388.
18 See G. REUBER, supra note 1.
19 The United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations has, for years, been collecting
legislation affecting foreign investment in several countries. Such legislation includes incentive legis-
lation for attracting foreign investment. The list of countries includes several developing countries.
See UNCTC, NATIONAL LEGISLATION, supra note 2.
20 See Yelpaala, The Impact of Industrial Legislation on the Behavior of MNEs and Labor in the
Industrializing Countries of the East and Southeast Asia, 6 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. (1985)
(forthcoming) [hereinafter Yelpaala, Impact of Industrial Legislation].
21 UNCTC, NATIONAL LEGISLATION, supra note 2, at 29-39.
22 See, eg., The Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and
Foreign Investment, 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1163 (1979); Regulations for the Implementation
of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment,
22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1033 (1983); Rules for the Implementation of Exchange Control Regu-
lations, 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1049 (1983); Income Tax Law Concerning Joint Ventures with
Chinese and Foreign Investment, 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1452 (1980); Regulations on the Re-
gistration of Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1453 (1980). There has been a proliferation of articles written on the People's Republic of China and
foreign capital, joint ventures and similar issues. Only a few are noted here. See Note, The New
Legal Framework for Joint Ventures in China: Guidelines for Investors, 16 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus.
1005 (1984); Klitgaard & Rasmussen, Preferential Treatment for Foreign Investment in the People's
Republic of China: Special Economic Zones and Industrial Development Districts, 7 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REv. 377 (1984); Comment, Chinese Legal Inducementsfor the Development of a Do-
mestic Petroleum Industry, 20 TEx. INT'L L.J 189 (1985); Current Development, Evaluating China's
Special Economic Zones, 2 INT'L TAX & BUS. LAW. 376 (1984); Fenwick, Equity Joint Ventures in
the People's Republic of China: An Assessment of the First Five Years, 40 Bus. LAW. 839 (1985).
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for their incentives continues to be the capital arbitrage theory.
Reliance on tax incentives by developing countries as instruments
for attracting FDI continues to be baffling in the face of the known pat-
terns of behavior of the MNE. Despite their sometimes liberal tax incen-
tive packages, developing countries have been the least attractive to
MNEs. 23 FDI tends to originate from a few developed market econo-
mies and go to a few developed countries.24 Current statistics show that
MNEs tend to locate their foreign operations in the richer of the richest
and the richer of the poorest countries of the world.2 5
These patterns or preferences suggest that MNEs are attracted to
countries with the greatest economic potential or with affluent markets.
They also suggest that the tax burdens in these markets have not been a
significant deterrent to investments. They further suggest that, left alone,
MNEs will continue to locate their plants in countries with the highest
economic potential. The implication is that developing countries will
continue to be the least attractive to MNEs unless something is done to
reverse the pattern.
If MNEs are to play a significant role in the impending structural
transformation of the 1980s, home and host countries must develop ap-
propriate FDI policies which reflect the theory of the MNE. Since the
capital arbitrage theory and its connection to tax incentives has proven to
be dubious at best and ineffective at worst, it is important at this stage to
investigate the possibility of more effective FDI incentive policies based
on other theories of the MNE. Therefore, the focus of this article is on
the incentive policy possibilities of other theories of the FDI process.
II. THE MNE SYSTEM AND INCENTIVES
One significant problem of policymakers is their apparent lack of
complete understanding of the MNE phenomenon. From its inception,
the MNE has been the subject of intensive study and controversy.26 As
23 See UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, SALIENT FEATURES
AND TRENDS IN FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 11-12, 38, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/14 (1983) [herein-
after UNCTC, SALIENT FEATURES]. See also ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DE-
VELOPMENT ("OECD"), INVESTING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 20 (5th rev. ed. 1983)
[hereinafter OECD, INVESTING].
24 UNCTC, SALIENT FEATURES, supra note 23; UNCTC, THIRD SURVEY, supra note 1, at 27.
25 See generally UNCTC, THIRD SURVEY, supra note I, at 34-35. See also OECD, INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: RECENT INTERNATIONAL DIRECT IN-
VESTMENT TRENDS (1981) [hereinafter OECD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT].
26 The literature on the MNE is so voluminous that it would be impossible to provide a complete
list here. It will be sufficient to list material representing various viewpoints in the debate. See, eg.,
L. TURNER, MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND THE THIRD WORLD (1975); N. GIRVAN, CORPO-
RATE IMPERIALISM: CONFLICT AND EXPROPRIATION (1976); GLOBAL COMPANIES: THE POLIT-
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such, the MNE should be a well-known entity to policymakers. None-
theless, the MNE is an economic phenomenon that appears to defy defi-
nition. Although several definitions have been suggested, 7 the most
useful definition is one which links the MNE with its characteristic at-
tributes and distinctive behavior.
The MNE is best understood as a system. 5 It is functionally an
international system that owns or commands globally vast amounts of
technological, financial, managerial, human, or marketing resources.
The MNE represents a network of operations, services, or a global mul-
tiplant system connected through a common resource pool and a com-
mon strategy with all its component parts. The structure is controlled by
a monocentric or polycentric management command system. As such,
the MNE enjoys tremendous flexibility in its operational decision pro-
cess. Its decisions are neither bound nor seriously limited by considera-
tions of distance, time, space, or by regional, national, or cultural
allegiances. Though considerations of plant location, marketing, import,
or export operations might fall to the dictates of the management control
system, such considerations are designed to enhance the flexibility of the
multinational system.
MNEs differ in size, technical capabilities, and degree of product
ICAL ECONOMY OF WORLD BUSINESS (W. Ball ed. 1975); R. BARNET & R. MULLER, GLOBAL
REACH: THE POWER OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (1974); T. GLADWIN & I. WAL-
TER, MULTINATIONALS UNDER FIRE (1980); A. FRANK, CRISIS: IN THE WORLD ECONOMY
(1980); S. AMIN, ACCUMULATION ON A WORLD SCALE; A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF UN-
DERDEVELOPMENT (1974); C. VIATSOS, INTERCOUNTRY INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND TRANSNA-
TIONAL ENTERPRISES (1974); R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD
OF U.S. ENTERPRISES (1971) [hereinafter R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY]; R. VERNON,
STORM, supra note 1; C. BERGSTEN, T. HORST, & T. MORAN, AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS AND
AMERICAN INTERESTS (1978); MULTINATIONAL MANAGERS AND POVERTY IN THE THIRD
WORLD (L. Tavis ed. 1982); S. LALL & P. STREETEN, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, TRANSNATIONAL
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1977).
27 The Multinational Enterprise as a phenomenon has been characterized by definitional
problems from its inception. Some definitions stress multinationality, geographic dispersion, and
management orientation, while others stress control. The following are examples of the attempts at
defining the MNE. See generally UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AF-
FAIRS, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT 5 (1974). Some definitions
emphasize several different criteria. For instance, for criteria such as: 1). organizational structure
and ownership, see Aharoni, On the Definition of a Multinational Corporation, in THE MULTINA-
TIONAL ENTERPRISE IN TRANSITION 4-5 (A. Kapoor & P. Grub eds. 1972); 2). the number of
countries in which operations are carried on, see Dunning, The Multinational Enterprise: The Back-
ground, in THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 15, 16 (J. Dunning ed. 1971); 3). size of total opera-
tions, see R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY, supra note 22, at 4 (1971); 4). attitude of management
(ethnocentric, polycentric or geocentric), see Perlmutter, The Tortuous Evolution of the Multina-
tional Corporation, in THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE IN TRANSITION, supra, at 53; Ball, Cosmo
Corp: The Importance of Being Stateless, in WORLD BUSINESS 337 (C. Brown ed. 1970).
28 See Yelpaala, Impact of Industrial Legislation, supra note 16.
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and geographic diversification. For example, MNEs range from the
world's largest grocery products company, Unilever, with operations in
seventy-five countries and sales in 1980 of $24 billion,29 to Wrigley
Chewing Gum Company, with a sales of $500 million.3" It has been
estimated that there are today about 10,000 MNEs with a total of about
100,000 subsidiaries.3 Most of these MNEs are small and have opera-
tions in two or three countries. Nonetheless, the MNEs that are respon-
sible for a substantial portion of FDI are the largest 500 companies in the
world. Each of the MNEs, small or large, constitutes a separate system
varying in size, complexity, and flexibility depending upon its total avail-
able resources and the number of countries in which it operates. Hence,
the impact of any policy designed for the MNE would vary depending
upon the MNE's degree of flexibility.
This flexibility is inherent in the MNE control and management
command system and permits the MNE to manipulate its global opera-
tions in response to various economic stimuli, costs, government attitude,
and geo-political considerations.3" Thus, the same MNE, through the
establishment of foreign subsidiaries or global affiliates, may extract raw
material in one country, to be manufactured as semi-finished products in
a second country, to be used in the manufacture of a finished product in a
third country, to be marketed in yet a fourth country.3 3 Therefore,
through this system of linkages between parent MNE and its foreign affil-
iates and between the affiliates themselves, the MNE is afforded the op-
portunity to use each affiliate as a conduit for shuttling resources from
one country to another or to shift profits from high-tax regimes to low-
29 J. CONNOR, MULTINATIONAL FIRMS IN THE WORLD FOOD MARKETING SYSTEM 3 (CES
Paper No. 112, Apr. 1984).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 2.
32 There are some rather interesting studies pointing out the dynamism of MNEs' import/export
policies, dividend pay-out, and dividend remittance behavior in response to various stimuli in the
international environment. See, e.g., Horst, The Theory of the Multinational Firm: Optimal Behav-
ior under Different Tariff and Tax Rates, 79 J. POL. ECON. 1059 (1971) [hereinafter Horst, Optimal
Behavior]; Horst, American Taxation of Multinational Firms, 67 AM. ECON. REv. 376 (1977). See
also Kopits, Dividend Remittance Within the International Firm: A Cross-Country Analysis, 54 REv.
ECON. & STATS. 339 (1972); Kopits, Intra-Firm Royalties Crossing Frontiers and Transfer Pricing
Behavior, 86 ECON. J. 791 (1976); Mutti, Tax Incentives and the Repatriation Decisions of U.S. Mul-
tinational Corporations, 34 NAT'L TAX J. 241 (1981); Lall, Transfer-Pricing by Multinational Manu-
facturing Firms, 35 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STAT. 173 (1973).
33 The inherent flexibility in the MNE and its global system was vividly described by Newfarmer
and Mueller in an interesting report to the U.S. Congress in 1975: see R. NEWFARMER & W.
MUELLER, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN BRAZIL AND MEXICO: STRUCTURAL SOURCES OF
ECONOMIC AND NONECONOMIC POWER, REPORT TO THE SUBCOMM. ON MULTINATIONAL COR-
PORATIONS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (Comm.
Print 1975).
Alternatives to Tax Incentive Policies
7:208(1985)
tax regimes according to the dictates of the management command
system.
An important aspect of the MNE system is the degree of isolation
between MNEs. Each MNE system constitutes a separate system, sug-
gesting that an important industry in a country might be fragmented
along oligopolistic lines thereby resulting in certain allocative inefficien-
cies and the loss of control by the host government. This is illustrated by
the experience of Ghana in dealing with some of the largest MNEs in the
aluminum industry. These MNEs operate as isolated units, with most of
their linkages created within their own systems. Accordingly, the alumi-
num industry in Ghana is fragmented and so are its connections with the
rest of the global aluminum industry. As a result, Ghana exports baux-
ite, imports alumina, exports primary aluminum, and imports rolled alu-
minum to be fabricated into aluminum products.34
One may characterize the typical large MNE as potentially "foot
loose"'35 or as an acquisitive and gigantic octopus, its tentacles sprawling
all over the globe. This analogy is borne out by the high degree of MNE
concentration by country of origin, industry, growth, diversification, and
internal operational dynamics. The bulk of the FDI in the world comes
from a very small number of industrialized countries. Only six such
countries-United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Switzer-
land, and France-account for more than eighty percent of the total
global stock of FDI.3 6 From this small number of countries, the MNE
system spreads out globally. In 1976 there were about 11,000 companies
that operated 82,600 foreign affiliates worldwide.37 Out of this total,
about 371 MNEs operated in at least twenty or more countries.38
For some of the world's largest MNEs, the geographic diversifica-
tion of their operations is even more outstanding. In 1973, it was esti-
mated that IBM operated in as many as eighty countries, while Siemens
and ITT operated in fifty-two and forty countries, respectively.39 The
corresponding figures for MNEs in the oil industry are equally impres-
sive. Mobil, Gulf, and Shell operated in sixty-two, sixty-one, and forty-
three countries, respectively.' ° These foreign operations have always
34 D. HART, THE VOLTA RIVER PROJECT 59 (1980).
35 P. BUCKLEY & M. CASSON, THE FUTURE OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 13 (1976).
36 OECD, INVESTING, supra note 23, at 20.
37 J. DUNNING, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 3
(1981) [hereinafter J. DUNNING, INT'L PROD.].
38 Id.
39 P. BUCKLEY & M. CASSON, supra note 35, at 12-13.
40 Id.
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been very important in MNE total operations.4 1 For example, in 1977
the sale of the foreign affiliates of 866 of the world's largest industrial
enterprises accounted for twenty-seven percent of their total sales vol-
ume.42 The foreign content ratio of these enterprises in manufacturing,
as calculated by John Dunning and Robert Pearce, was also quite
substantial.43
The relationship between these foreign affiliates and their parent
MNEs is not one of isolated and independent existence. They are linked
together through the necessity of horizontal and vertical diversification,
common resource pool, common international marketing and distribu-
tion strategy, common technological needs, and management control.'
These connections are certainly obvious in the manufacturing industry
where the incidence of horizontal diversification has been adequately
documented.4 5 Subsidiaries of MNE trading companies, such as the Jap-
anese trading houses, have always needed their parents for access to
world markets.4 6 Evidence of vertical diversification can be found in the
frequency and size of intra-firm transactions between MNEs and their
subsidiaries. Though the statistics and data on these transactions are still
incomplete, the information which does exist suggests that the size of
intra-firm transactions within the MNE system is fairly significant. For
instance, in 1974, forty-six percent of all imports to the United States
were intra-firm.4 7 It is also estimated that roughly fifty percent of the
exports from the United States in 1970 and thirty-nine percent of Cana-
dian exports in 1971 were all within the MNE system.4 8
In 1977, United States MNEs accounted for about eighty-four per-
cent and fifty-eight percent of the value of United States exports and im-
ports, respectively.4 9 Intra-MNE imports accounted for forty-eight
percent of the total value.5 ° These MNEs have shown a strong prefer-
ence for intra-firm transactions with higher degrees of processing. More-
over, MNEs no longer consider locating their production facilities near
their markets as important. Large MNEs in the automobile and elec-
41 J. DUNNING, INT'L PROD., supra note 37, at 3.
42 Id. See also UNCTC, THIRD SURVEY, supra note 1, at 18.
43 See J. DUNNING & R. PEARCE, THE WORLD'S LARGEST INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES 110
(1981). See also J. DUNNING, INT'L PROD., supra note 37, at 4.
44 R. VERNON, STORM, supra note 1, at 19-37. See also P. BUCKLEY & M. CASSON, supra note
35, at 20.
45 P. BUCKLEY & M. CASSON, supra note 35.
46 T. OZAWA, MULTINATIONALISM, JAPANESE STYLE 45 (1979).
47 UNCTC, THIRD SURVEY, supra note 1, at 161.
48 Id.
49 J. CONNOR, supra note 29, at 13.
50 Id.
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tronics industries, for example, now prefer to set up networks of inte-
grated production units located in different countries but all involved in
the processing of different stages or parts of the final product." Such
production is generally required to serve the needs of the parent or other
members of the group in third countries. A significant amount of MNE
investments in certain cheap labor havens such as Taiwan and South Ko-
rea are of this character.5 2 Bruce Kogut 53 has suggested that the dyna-
mism and flexibility of the MNE system constitutes its primary
advantage because it provides several options to the MNE.54 Viewed in
this way, the MNE system has operational value to its managers since it
increases and links together options and opportunities which otherwise
would have been less attractive. . I
It is clear from this analysis that the MNE is a very complex phe-
nomenon which, in several cases, has developed a global mind set. The
MNE views its own national economy as too limited for its potential in
production, sales, and resource utilization. This global orientation, cou-
pled with the existence of foreign affiliates, means the MNE can expand
its economic space at will. If this is the type of entity that current tax
incentive legislation is addressing, then serious questions are raised about
the appropriateness of any policy that does not focus on these attributes
of the MNE. Given the tremendous flexibility in the behavior of the
MNE, one must ask: what types of policies would induce MNE invest-
ment and where would its operational effects be felt? Since the MNE can
structure its manufacturing and distribution system by choosing the
countries with policies which suit it best, the MNE system may pur-
posely burden some countries with negative externalties and bless others
with substantial welfare benefits.
The operations of the MNE can affect any or all of the nations in-
cluded in this system at both the micro- and macro-economic levels in
terms of contributions to gross national product, prices, profitability, and
national revenue. For those countries linked together by this process, the
ability of each to benefit from MNE operations will not be a simple func-
tion of any monolithic tax incentive legislation, but how each country by
design fits into the MNE system. Can incentive legislation which does
not recognize the inherent flexibility of MNE behavior effectively induce
FDI?
51 OECD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, supra note 25, at 31.
52 Yelpaala, Impact of Industrial Legislation, supra note 20.
53 Kogut, Foreign Direct Investment as a Sequential Process, in THE MULTINATIONAL CORPO-
RATION IN THE 1980s, supra note 1, at 38, 42-43.
54 Id. at 46-47.
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Thus the question of what are the appropriate policies for attracting
FDI requires at least a thorough understanding of the MNE system. In
addition, such policies should be based on those theories of the MNE
that most closely reflect the MNE system and its distinctive behavior.
The task of the following sections is to explore, within the context of the
MNE, those policy options which appear to incorporate some of the
MNE's characteristics.
III. INTANGIBLE ASSETS THEORY OF FDI
A useful place to start an exploration of alternative incentive poli-
cies is the intangible assets theory. Critics of the capital arbitrage theory
argue that central to the MNE's motivation to engage in foreign opera-
tions is the possession of some proprietary knowledge or intangible as-
sets.55 (As used here, the two terms are interchangeable.) This theory
holds that the most successful firms in any industry possess, in some
form, intangible assets to the exclusion of others. The nature or charac-
ter of these intangible assets may take different forms. They may repre-
sent technology, knowledge of cost-minimizing productive efficiency,
patented processes, registered trademarks, designs, or brand names.
They may even rest on production or trade secrets known to and shared
by the employees of a particular firm or skills in styling or promoting
products.5 6 What all these intangible assets have in common is that they
are thought of as having the character of a "public good" in the sense
that they can be exploited over and over by several different firms with-
out depleting their usefulness.5 According to Harry Johnson, the acqui-
sition of such assets involves some initial investment outlays, but once
the knowledge or intangible asset is acquired, the investment costs are
considered sunk costs.58 After these developmental costs, the marginal
cost of exploiting such an asset abroad is practically nil for the MNE.
The marginal cost of such assets is lower than that of the local firm or
other firms that do not own similar intangible assets. Thus, according to
this theory, the local firm and others which do not own intangible assets
are at a competitive disadvantage with MNEs in the same industry.
-5 See, e.g., Gruber, Mehta, & Vernon, The R & D Factor in International Trade and Interna-
tional Investment of United States Industries, 75 J. POL. ECON. 20 (1967); Horst, Firm and Industry
Determinants of the Decision to Invest Abroad: An Empirical Study, 54 REV. ECON. & STAT. 258
(1972) [hereinafter Horst, An Empirical Study]; Johnson, The Efficiency and Welfare Implications of
the International Corporation, in THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 35 (C. Kindleberger ed.
1970).
56 R. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE, supra note 7, at 3-4.
57 Johnson, supra note 55, at 36.
58 Id.
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The possession of intangible assets or similar proprietary knowledge
alone cannot explain the MNE motivation for FDI because MNEs have
other alternatives to FDI. They may choose to service foreign markets
through exports from their production at home. They may even grant an
assignment or license of their know-how or technology to a local pro-
ducer. The choice to engage in foreign operations, therefore, must have
some additional advantage: it must offer the highest return in compari-
son with the other alternatives. For instance, the direct exports option
might be saddled with heavy transportation costs, excessive customs du-
ties, high tariff and nontariff barriers, thereby making the product un-
competitive at prevailing market prices in the importing country.
Similarly, several obstacles to licensing may exist. The host government
may control and supervise licensing agreements in terms of their substan-
tive content or royalties agreed upon by the parties. Moreover, the local
licensee may be both unwilling and unable to pay the appropriate rent.
Under either of these circumstances the owner of the intangible assets
cannot reap the desired maximum returns.
Two general explanations for FDI are offered by the intangible as-
sets theory.5 9 First, MNEs engage in foreign operations because of the
problems of market imperfections associated with arms-length contrac-
tual transactions. Second, MNEs engage in foreign operations for cost
reasons." MNEs have firm-specific revenue-producing assets which can-
not be employed efficiently from their home base because of information,
communication, and transportation costs associated with the distance.61
To understand fully the intangible assets theory, it is necessary to ex-
amine these two explanations in greater detail.
A. Market Imperfections and FDI
According to the market imperfection hypothesis, MNEs with in-
tangible assets cannot sell or license them efficiently in conventional mar-
kets because of certain factors related to the assets' infirmities. First,
since intangible assets are treated as "public goods" from the point of
view of resource allocative efficiency, the rental price of such intangible
assets should be close to zero.62 While such a societal goal might be most
59 See R. CAVES, supra note 7, at 3-4; Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937);
S. HYMER, THE INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS OF NATIONAL FIRMS: A STUDY OF DIRECT FOR-
EIGN INVESTMENT 48 (1976); Johnson, supra note 55, at 37; P. BUCKLEY & M. CASSON, supra note
35, at 22-23.
60 Hirsch, An International Trade and Investment Theory of the Firm, 28 OXFORD ECON. PA-
PERS 258 (1976).
61 Id. at 259.
62 Johnson, supra note 55, at 41.
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acceptable to the renters of technology, it is not in the interests of profit-
maximizing MNE owners of technology. This situation is further com-
plicated by the perceptions and realities of technology transfer. For ex-
ample, what is the appropriate rental price of obsolete technology to a
licensee in a developing country? Should the rental price be controlled
by its market value in the home market, in which it is obsolete, or in the
host country? It appears equally difficult to determine the rental price of
frontline technology when the foreign licensee has been induced into
questioning the claimed value of technology in general. Under these cir-
cumstances the intangible assets theory suggests that MNEs would prefer
to invest in the use of their technology abroad.
In any arms-length transaction for technology, there are likely to be
several problems related to uncertainty in the terms and distrust among
the parties. For example, the seller must prove the quality, operational
capabilities, and value of the technology, but disclose only as much as is
necessary to strike a deal. The buyer may suspect the seller of opportu-
nism and overstating the value. There might also be problems relating to
disparities in bargaining power. In view of these contract law related
problems, profit-maximizing MNE owners of technology would prefer to
invest in their use abroad.
63
While these arguments appear relevant to horizontal FDI, they may
be equally applicable to vertical investments.' MNEs relying on foreign
suppliers for primary factor inputs have to work the spot and futures
markets efficiently or develop long-term stable contractual relationships
with their suppliers. However, both of these markets, either in the short
or long run, are riddled with costly and significant contract and perform-
ance uncertainties.65 Without control over the production and transpor-
tation, MNEs would face uncertainties in the levels of output, delivery
dates, and prices over time. Consequently, firms seek to own or control
vertically their sources of primary or intermediate factor inputs through
FDI.
B. Cost Factors in FDI
The relationship between costs and FDI in the use of intangible as-
sets was developed most elaborately by Seev Hirsch.66 According to
Hirsch, given the possession of some intangible assets ("K"), the ques-
tion whether a profit-maximizing firm will service its foreign markets
63 R. CAVES, supra note 7, at 4-6.
64 Id. at 16.
65 M. CASSON, ALTERNATIVES TO THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 48-49 (1979).
66 Hirsch, supra note 60, at 260.
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through exports or engage in foreign operations is determined by cost
factors.67
First, the firm will be concerned with the production costs in both
the host ("Pb") and home ("Pa") countries. Second, there are costs asso-
ciated with controlling foreign operations ("C") from the home base.
Some of these costs relate to the internal structures, dynamics, manage-
ment, and coordination of decentralized global production operations.
Other cost items relate to the host country's environment, such as its tax
system, labor codes, and other regulatory institutions and machinery.
Finally, the firm must face the export marketing cost differential ("M")
which is the positive difference between export and domestic marketing
costs. 68 The former exceeds the latter because it is always more costly to
export than to produce and sell within the host country.
Given these cost items, Hirsch concluded that FDI will take place
under the following conditions:
(1) Pb + C < Pb + K
(2) Pb±C<Pa M.
69
Since Pb is the same on both sides of Equation 1, that equation merely
states that FDI will take place when there are net positive returns on the
use of intangible assets in the host country, taking into account all the
costs associated with controlling foreign operations. In comparison,
Equation 2 takes into consideration comparative total costs. In other
words, FDI will take place if the cost of production plus the cost of con-
trolling foreign operations in the host country is less than the alterna-
tive-the total of the costs of production and the export marketing cost
differential.
The intangible assets hypothesis has some empirical support. The
boom in United States MNEs and their foreign operations, particularly
after the Second World War, is said to have been closely associated with
their adjustments to technological possibilities.70 In fact, this relation-
ship dates back to the period before the First World War. In a historical
analysis of United States MNEs, Mira Wilkins found that, even in the
early days of the MNE, superiority in knowledge was very important in
the FDI process. 71 Superior know-how explains the FDI operations of
such firms as Singer and American Radiator. A wide variety of empiri-
67 Id.
68 Id. at 261.
69 Id. at 264.
70 Hufbauer, The Multinational Corporation and Direct Investment, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND FINANCE: FRONTIERS FOR RESEARCH 253 (P. Kenen ed. 1975).
71 M. WILKINS, THE EMERGENCE OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: AMERICAN BUSINESS
ABROAD FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO 1914, at 77 (1970).
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cal studies conducted to test the validity of the intangible assets theory
tend to show that the theory explains the foreign investment behavior of
several United States MNEs in the manufacturing industry. Several
studies by economists such as William Gruber, Dileep Mehta, Raymond
Vernon,7 2 Thomas Horst,7" Thomas Pugel,74 and Sanjaya Lall,7 5 all
found a positive link between research and development ("R & D") out-
lays and FDI. Others found a significant relationship between manage-
rial skills and talent and FDI.76 This theory has also found empirical
support in the investment behavior of United States firms involved in the
extractive industries,77 banking, and other service industries.7 8
C. Intangible Assets-Incentive Policy Implications
An analysis of the policy implications of this theory requires some
understanding of its basic underlying assumptions. The intangible assets
theory assumes implicitly that all intangible assets constitute legally-pro-
tectible property with universally-recognized attributes. It assumes the
existence of an international legal regime and a uniform set of national
rules adequately protecting the property interest in these assets, includ-
ing the grant of monopoly or semi-monopoly rights to owners of indus-
trial property limited in time to the period of protection. As a
technology owner, the MNE is one of the most powerful phenomena in
the capitalist system; nonetheless it insists on these protections at home
and abroad against new entrants, imitators, and industrial pirates. This
protection becomes an economic imperative if the MNE is to maintain its
industrial characteristics and reap monopoly profits on the use of its
technology abroad.
Thus, at the international level, adequate legal protection requires
some participation by host countries in various multilateral, bilateral, or
regional conventions and treaties which recognize and protect industrial
property rights similar to those enjoyed in the home country. Despite
72 Gruber, Mehta & Vernon, supra note 55.
73 Horst, The Industrial Composition of U.S. Exports and Subsidiary Sales to the Canadian Mar-
ket, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 37-45 (1972).
74 T. PUGEL, INTERNATIONAL MARKET LINKAGES AND U.S. MANUFACTURING: PRICES,
PROFITS AND PATTERNS 69 (1978).
75 Lall, Monopolistic Advantages and Foreign Involvement by U.S. Manufacturing Industry, 32
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 102 (1980) [hereinafter Lall, Monopolistic Advantages].
76 See, e.g., T. PUGEL, supra note 74, at 197-98; J. Jarrett, Offshore Assembly and Production
and the Internalization of International Trade Within the Multinational Corporation (1979) (Ph.D.
dissertation); B. SWENDENBORG, THE MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS OF SWEDISH FIRMS: AN
ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS AND EFFECTS 22 (1979).
77 T. PUGEL, supra note 74, at 18-19.
78 R. CAVES, supra note 7, at 11.
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the current controversy, the Paris Convention of 1883 is an example of a
multilateral system of industrial property protection to which several de-
veloped and developing countries have subscribed. 79 There appears to be
little or no conceptual difficulty with the recognition of industrial prop-
erty. The problem lies with the nature and extent of protection.80 There-
fore, some regional groups have sought to harmonize their treatment of
industrial property in the FDI process."1 At the national level, adequate
protection for technology owners would include not just statutes protect-
ing patents, trademarks, and know-how, but effective judicial systems to
stop infringers and provide remedies.
Given these implicit assumptions about the legal regimes of host
countries, the theory postulates the conditions for FDI to take place.
MNEs, the theory states, are very sensitive to instability and uncertainty
in their technology transfer and supply contracts. Licensing contracts
are fraught with many uncertainties relating to royalties or fees and other
factors. Long-term raw material or intermediate supply contracts are
similarly fraught with uncertainties relating to the vagaries of price fluc-
tuations, quality, non-performance, and the inability to meet delivery
dates. To bypass these contract-related problems, MNEs engage in hori-
zontal and vertical FDI so that they can control the manufacturing pro-
cess using their own technology or maintain complete control over their
supply lines.
If these assumptions are true, then this theory has implications for
countries that possess exploitable natural resources or are interested in
expanding their manufacturing industries. Several developing countries
are heavily dependent on their primary resources for their economic sur-
vival. The policies of these countries have often also stressed the need for
manufactured export expansion or import substitution. Countries rely-
ing on such policies hope that they will have some positive effects on
employment, balance of payments, and intersectoral linkages. The the-
ory, therefore, opens up certain policy possibilities if the host countries'
objectives can be achieved.
1. Market Imperfections and Incentive Policies
It should be noted that the contract-related market imperfections
79 Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 161 Parry's T.S. (Fr.)
409, revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
80 An examination of the current draft on the proposed changes in the Paris Union would con-
firm this position. See, eg., World Intellectual Property Organization, Paris Union: Basic Proposals
for the Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the Paris Convention, INDUS. PROP., Nov. 1979, at
243.
81 W. WHITE & B. RAVENSCROFT, PATENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 571 (1982).
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described above do not immediately suggest any tax policy instruments
as a means of inducing FDI. They are not the type of factors which
generally concern tax policymakers. Moreover, if these market imperfec-
tions exist, then MNEs have the necessary conditions for FDI. There-
fore, these imperfections should not be removed if the host country
wishes to entice FDI. If, on the other hand, the market imperfections do
not exist, the question is whether the host country should create them to
attract FDI.
The experience of several host countries tends to show that these
imperfections already exist. The practice of several host countries of in-
tervening in contractual transactions between MNEs and local licensees
is not to create distortions within the markets, but to correct certain ac-
tual or perceived distortions, inequities, and negative effects of technol-
ogy transfer transactions not addressed by the theory. 2 For instance, the
theory does not question the appropriateness of the technology trans-
ferred nor its price and general impact on the national economy. It is the
belief of several developing countries that the technology transferred by
MNEs is generally more capital intensive than their needs, exploitative in
price, restrictive in use, and marginal in its developmental impact on the
local economy. Moreover, the relationship between local licensees and
MNE technology owners is characterized as being unequal in terms of
bargaining power. Large MNEs, in particular, are perceived as having
excessive bargaining power-because of their oligopolistic position in
these markets and their monopoly rights in technology-with which they
can exploit local licensees.
Countries such as Brazil, Mexico, and South Korea have all inter-
vened in various ways to control licensing fees, royalties for patents, and
trademarks transactions.83 Others have sought to control the type and
82 Correa, Transfer of Technology in Latin America: A Decade of Control, 15 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 388, 391-92 (1981); Ozawa, Technology Transfer and Control Systems: The Japanese Experience,
in CONTROLLING INT'L TECH. TRANSFER, supra note 5, at 376; Mason, Technology Transfer Con-
trol Systems: The Case of East and Southeast Asian Developing Countries, in CONTROLLING INT'L
TECH. TRANSFER, supra note 5, at 430; Juncadella, The Foreign Investment Laws of Latin America:
Present and Future, 16 INT'L LAW. 463 (1982); Wilner, The Transfer of Technology to Latin
America, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 269 (1981); Bledel, The Latin American Development Process
and the New Legislative Trends, 10 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 325 (1980); French, Brazil's Profit
Remittance Law: Reconciling Goals in Foreign Investments, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 399
(1982); Kryzda, Joint Ventures and Technology Transfers, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 549 (1980);
Radway & Hoet-Linares, Venezuela Revisited: Foreign Investment, Technology and Related Issues,
15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1982); Colloquium on Certain Legal Aspects of Foreign Investment in
Mexico: Regulation of Capital Investment, Patents and Trademarks, and Transfer of Technology, 7
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 1 (1977).
83 Rosenn, Regulation of Foreign Investment in Brazil: A Critical Analysis, 15 LAW. AM. 307,
321-25 (1983); see also sources cited supra note 82.
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conditions for the transfer of technology. Two possible conclusions can
be drawn. First, that host governments seek to intervene in these mar-
kets implies that the necessary conditions for FDI under this theory ex-
ist. Second, even if the conditions do not exist, the present form of
government market intervention would create them. Therefore, in the
limited case of government policy implications, host governments need
not do anything more to attract FDI.
The intangible assets hypothesis also seems to suggest that imperfec-
tions in the information markets for technology arise from the malfunc-
tioning of the markets rather than government intervention. This is not
the appropriate place to enter into the current debate over normative-
and ideologically-oriented concepts about the proper relationships be-
tween the regulatory functions of a legal system and economic efficiency
as a national objective.84 Nevertheless, it is important to question
whether, on the basis of allocative or distributive efficiency, a government
should purposefully create economic distortions or increase them as a
stimulus to foreign investment. This is even more important given that
the entities to be enticed are MNEs with a tremendous ability to exploit
their environment. The real issue is, therefore, whether these market
imperfections are necessary for FDI or whether they actually permit
MNEs to reap monopoly rents in the use of their technology abroad. If
reaping monopoly rents is the issue-as the MNE system might sug-
gest-then a policy designed to correct market imperfections might en-
courage the appropriate FDI up to an optimal level by eliminating the
opportunity for monopoly rents.
Johnson has suggested that it is possible to have an optimal national
policy under this theory. Since intangible assets have the character of
"public goods," optimality requires that they be acquired by the host
government through a lump-sum payment and be made available to all
potential users, both foreign and domestic,85 without charge. This sug-
gestion does not eliminate the contract problems inherent in these assets.
Nor does it eliminate the fear and reluctance of MNEs to provide host
governments with the technological ammunition that might be used
against them by the MNE's competitors. The suggestion, however, will
84 There has, in recent years, been a debate on the issue of efficiency and national economic
policy goals. See Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HoisTrA L. REV. 485 (1980),
where contributions of some of the most prominent authorities can be found. See, eg., Posner, The
Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, supra, at 487; Cala-
bresi, An Exchange About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, supra, at 553; and
Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, supra, at 563. See also A Response to the Efficiency Symposium, 8 HoF-
gTRA L. REv. 811 (1980).
85 Johnson, supra note 55.
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provide a subsidy to all enterprises using that technology. For the MNE
that originally owned the technology, the subsidy could prove to be quite
important, since the MNE would use and control internally technology
for which it has already paid. If allowed to create and operate its system
freely, the MNE could generate and maintain its operational options and
flexibility with assets provided by the host government. However, the
benefits to the host country are unclear. It is therefore doubtful whether
Johnson's pareto-optimality solution has any practical utility in the cur-
rent international economic scene. The importance of Johnson's sugges-
tion highlights the need for government involvement.
The policy implications here are complex. What, for example, ex-
plains the fact that Liberia, unlike Brazil, South Korea, or Mexico, is not
interventionist in technology transfer transactions, and yet attracts very
little manufacturing or total FDI?86 Moreover, several developed market
economies which espouse the philosophy of laissez faire, such as Liberia,
have attracted most of the world's FDI.87 Therefore, the theory must
assume that profitable opportunities exist for it to work because the dif-
ference between Liberia and these other countries is that Liberia is not as
attractive to MNEs in several sectors.
What has emerged from this discussion of the policy options is that
host countries should not do anything more to attract the infusion of
foreign technology through FDI. However, from our understanding of
the MNE, particularly its operational flexibility, host countries cannot
afford a "hands-off" policy towards FDI and the technology package
that comes with it. Left alone, the MNE will determine the role each
country should play within its operational network and the technology
package facilitating that role. By transferring technology within its sys-
tem, the MNE may achieve several objectives inimical to the interest of
the host country. The technology transfer transaction may reflect the
MNE's cost allocation, profit sharing, or pricing policies which may have
nothing to do with the marketplace or efficiency goals of the host govern-
ment. The parent MNE may carry out its global market allocation poli-
cies by imposing various restrictive business practices on its subsidiaries.
These restrictions may include those on output volume, exports, research
and development, and others generally condemned by several
countries.
88
86 See K. Yelpaala, The Efficacy of Fiscal Incentives Within the Dynamics of the Multinational
Enterprise: The Case of Ghana and Liberia ch. 5. (A Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
Requirement of the Degree of Doctor of Juridical Science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison
(1985)) (available from the author).
87 Id.
88 See Ariga, Restrictive Business Practices and International Controls on Transfer of Technology,
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It follows that, even if the conditions for FDI exist, host countries
have very important reasons to ensure that the technology which enters
the MNE system through its local subsidiaries advances certain specific
host country objectives. It is also important that such technology is free
from all encumbrances and restrictions detrimental to the host country's
interest and industrial policies. In this process, the host country cannot
afford to play a passive role if specific technology transfer policy objec-
tives are to be met. The host country should determine how the MNE
system fits into the country's economic goals before determining appro-
priate technology policies. For instance, suppose a host country is deter-
mined to develop and become internationally competitive in a complex
industry such as the chemical industry. What would be the appropriate
technique? By its very nature, the chemical industry should require a
fairly complex and capital-intensive technology. To ensure competitive
product quality, frontline technology and a very efficient skilled labor
force may be required. What then would be the most appropriate host
country policies for encouraging investments in the chemical industry?
First, the host country could subsidize the desired specific technology
either directly or indirectly. It could subsidize the cost of such technol-
ogy or offer guarantees of specific rental rates as between the parent and
subsidiary. It could also subsidize the training of skilled technicians es-
sential for such technology. For a host country which is determined to
develop local technical expertise, its labor policies for FDI provide an
opportunity to examine policy options for achieving those objectives and
encouraging FDI.
In contrast, if the host government is interested in encouraging ad-
aptation and R & D, it may encourage the transfer of technology that
would easily lend itself to adaption and modification. Such technology
need not be frontline technology. For the benefits of adaptation to be
realized, the policy may include initially some local participation and
eventually a fade-out period by the foreign investors. The host govern-
in CONTROLLING INT'L TECH. TRANSFER, supra note 5, at 177. See also UNITED NATIONS COM-
MISSION ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT ("UNCTAD"), CONTROL OF RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS
PRACTICES IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, REPORT BY THE UNCTAD SECRETA-
RIAT, U.N. Doc. TD/B/608, (1977); UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON TRADE AND DEVELOP-
MENT, CONTROL OF RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES IN TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSACTIONS,
U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/72 (1982); Cieglik, Restrictive Clauses in Licensing Agreements: The Pharma-
ceutical Industry in Developing Countries, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 415 (1984); UNITED NATIONS
COMMISSION ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, RESTRUCTURING LEGAL AND JURIDICAL ENVIRON-
MENT ISSUES UNDER NEGOTIATIONS-TECHNOLOGY, U.N. Doc. TD/2378 (1979); Thompson, The
UNCTAD Code on Transfer of Technology, 16 J. WORLD TRADE L. 311 (1982); Wilner, Transfer of
Technology. The UNCTAD Code of Conduct, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (M. Horn, ed. 1980).
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ment would then be required to subsidize the cost of adaptation, R & D,
and activities designed to foster its policy objectives. This approach calls
for an active and purposeful host country involvement in FDI technolog-
ical input. It also calls for a re-examination of the concept of appropriate
technology. The appropriateness of technology should not be deter-
mined solely by a country's level of development, but also by its potenti-
alities and specific government industrial policies. The experience of
Japan and the newly-industrializing countries suggest that a well-calcu-
lated policy, even if against conventional wisdom, might be more benefi-
cial to host countries. Therefore, given any host country's industrial
policy objectives, specific policies can be adopted to encourage the appro-
priate technology.
2. Cost and Incentive Policies
It is also possible to develop other incentive policy options under
this theory. They would appear to come under Hirsch's conditions for
FDI discussed above. According to Seev Hirsch's theory, FDI will take
place if either of the following inequality conditions exist: (1) Pb + C <
Pb + K; (2) Pb + C < Pa + M. In other words, in comparison with
serving foreign markets with exports, the use of intangible assets in FDI
should yield a net positive return. In dealing with the policy options for
inducing FDI, it is important to recognize that certain types of cost func-
tions are within the domain of host governments while others are con-
trolled by MNEs. For example, a decomposition of the production
function of an MNE may disclose that costs such as labor and imported
input may be influenced by minimum wage legislation, labor codes, legis-
lated employee benefit schemes, or customs duties of the host country.
However, other items of the production function, such as capital, might
be within the control of MNEs. Similarly, a closer look at the cost of
foreign operations, C, and the export cost differential, M, would suggest
that host government policies on FDI taxes, subsidies, and investment
incentives would affect C, while trade controls, tariffs, and export subsi-
dies would affect M.
What policy options are open to host governments for attracting
FDI? According to Hirsch's equations, tax incentives or similar cost-
reducing subsidies would lower the value of the left hand side of either
equation, thereby inducing FDI. However, as demonstrated earlier, the
efficacy of tax incentives for the purposes of attracting FDI is in serious
doubt.89 Moreover, there is the serious problem of costly redundancy
89 See Yelpaala, Efficacy of Tax Incentives, supra note 7; see generally sources cited supra notes 5
& 6.
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when tax incentive policies are combined with certain trade policies. For
example, given the existence of an adequate market size, trade barriers
would trigger defensive investments to protect markets acquired through
exports to the host country.90 Thus, in Equation 2, if the trade policies of
the host country increase the costs associated with exports, there might
be no need to decrease other costs such as taxes in the host country. This
confirms Robert Mundell's theoretical findings of a positive relationship
between trade barriers and the flow of FDI.9 1 Since the influences of tax
incentives on FDI are at best dubious, host countries' trade policies
might also be important variables in determining the appropriate incen-
tives for FDI.
Another important area in which host countries' policies could af-
fect the flow of FDI funds is labor costs. Wage rates generally are influ-
enced by local minimum wage laws and other statutes providing benefits
to labor. The host government can, through its statutes, peg the mini-
mum wages very low and provide very cheap overall protection and ben-
efits to its industrial workers. It might even undertake to ensure that
there are no strikes or other labor disturbances which are generally dis-
ruptive and costly to MNEs. Any policies along these lines might be
oppressive to local labor, but they are, unfortunately, capable of influenc-
ing the MNE's location of plant in a host country. There are several
examples of cheap-labor havens-generally called export-free zones-in
several east and southeast Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore, and Hong Kong.92 These export-free zones have attracted
several manufacturing and assembly operations by MNEs looking for
cheap and efficient production sites.
Through various statutes affecting labor unions, strikes, conditions
of employment, and minimum wage laws, these countries promised to
maintain a tight control over the conduct and benefits of labor within the
export-free zones.93 It became an attractive and, indeed, common prac-
tice for MNEs to haul in duty free, materials or component parts from
their various operations in developed countries for processing or assem-
bly in these export-free zones for eventual re-export to their global affili-
ates. These labor policies, however, are hardly a statement of the
distributive equities in MNE generated wealth. Labor might be paying a
very high price for the total industrial expansion of these countries. It
90 See Horst, Optimal Behavior, supra note 32.
91 Mundell, International Trade and Factor Mobility, 47 AM. ECON. RIv. 321, 324-25 (1957).
92 Yelpaala, Impact of Industrial Legislation, supra note 20.
93 Id. See also 1 E. UTRECHT, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN SoUTH EAST ASIA AND
THE PACIFIC (1978).
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would appear that even though the productivity of labor in these coun-
tries is sometimes equal to, or higher than, that of labor in some MNE
home countries, their wages and other benefits do not reflect their contri-
bution to the MNE system and wealth; nor are they in any way compara-
ble to those of other workers in similar categories in the home
countries.9 4
It would appear that the host country's labor laws and policies
could provide an important incentive for industrial expansion in the
manufacturing sector. However, the incentive policy prescription is not
that obvious. Cheap labor costs alone will not provide the necessary in-
centive for FDI. The cost of labor in several developing countries is very
low compared with that in the United States, but hardly attracts FDI.
Moreover, the destination of most FDI in the world is the developed
market economies which have higher labor costs than developing coun-
tries. In more recent years, the United States has started to become an
important home country for FD19' despite its comparative high labor
costs. This suggests that the efficiency of labor might be an important
factor here.
It is apparent from the MNE activities in these cheap-labor havens
that, in addition to being cheap, labor has to be efficient. MNEs also
appear to require a degree of flexibility that permits them to shuttle their
resources, goods, and services within their systems at will. Therefore, the
incentive value of cheap labor policies might well depend on the effi-
ciency of labor and the degree of freedom of action of MNEs within their
systems, rather than on the cheapness of labor. This raises the question
of whether MNEs will take advantage of cheap labor when they would
have invested at higher labor costs if their operational flexibility permit-
ted. Given these indeterminants in the motivations of MNEs, any host
94 Yelpaala, Impact of Industrial Legislation, supra note 20.
95 The growing importance of the United States as a host country for foreign investment has
been noted and written about by several commentators--only a few are noted here. See, e.g., Katz,
Foreign Direct Investment in the United States-Advantages and Barriers, 11 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L
L. 473 (1979). For an economic survey and statistical data, see Chung & Fouch, Foreign Direct
Investment in the United States in 1980, 61 SURV. CURRENT Bus. 40 (Aug. 1981); Chung & Fouch,
Foreign Direct Investments in the U.S. in 1979, 60 SURV. CURRENT Bus. 38 (Aug. 1980); Chung &
Fouch, Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S.: Country and Industry Detailfor Position and Balance
of Payment Flows, 1984, 65 SURv. CURRENT Bus. 47 (Aug. 1985). One foreign investment that has
drawn attention is the General Motors-Toyota joint venture. For discussion of that joint venture,
see Comment, International Joint Ventures in the United States: The GM-Toyota Deal, 22 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 505 (1984); Comment, The GM-Toyota Joint Venture and Its Implications under the
National Labor Relations Act, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 821 (1984); Note, The GM-Toyota Joint Ven-
ture: Legal Cooperation or Illegal Combination in the World Automobile Industry?, 19 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 699 (1984); R. HOUCK, III & N. CAYWOOD, LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1981).
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country's labor policies designed to entice MNE operations should ad-
dress the efficiency of labor and be sensitive to the various types of
worker exploitation induced and sanctioned by the labor statutes ex-
amined here.
General labor policies designed with FDI in mind might be ineffec-
tive for several host countries. Effective labor policies for encouraging
FDI should be task-directed and specific. Such policies should form part
of a coherent and well-thought-out industrial policy incorporating an ap-
propriate technology policy. Within this context, FDI labor policies may
include labor costs, the efficiency of labor, and labor skills. The appro-
priate policy mix for each country would then depend upon the type of
industry and investment, the technology input, the labor situation, and
host government objectives. Labor costs might become an important fac-
tor in a situation where the efficiency of labor is not an issue. Where, for
example, the host country with an efficient labor force has earmarked an
industry to be internationally-competitive in price and quality, low labor
costs could be an important inducement for FDI. However, for the pur-
poses of distributive equities in the host country, complementary policies
may be required to ensure that the burden of achieving such a policy
objective is evenly shared by the rest of society. There are, however,
several situations where the efficiency and levels of skilled labor, rather
than labor costs, become important deterrents to FDI. Under such cir-
cumstances, the appropriate policies for encouraging FDI should address
these issues.
Host government policies, as discussed earlier, could encourage FDI
within well-defined situations through subsidies and incentives for train-
ing local labor. Such a policy might be most effective if used in conjunc-
tion with other complementary policies. There might be cases where a
combination of policies would be appropriate. What is most crucial, is
the purposeful development of policies to respond to the MNE system.
For example, the general educational policies of a country might provide
the necessary impetus to attract MNEs with long-term strategic FDI
plans requiring a skilled labor force. In addition, the ownership of FDI
and policies requiring local participation in MNE operations might also
affect the efficacy of labor policies. Required in this approach is the ac-
tive involvement of host governments in choosing the technology which
enters their country's FDI process.
D. Summary
This theory calls for a more sophisticated approach to the FDI in-
ducement process. A host government can, through well-reasoned anal-
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ysis, break down the foreign investment process and identify those
factors related to its policies or regulations which serve as operative dis-
incentives to FDI. It can then work Hirsch's inequality conditions very
selectively and come up with a policy mix that is likely to be problem-
directed and effective within the framework of allocative efficiencies and
distributive equities. Given the problem with tax incentives, this ap-
proach permits a host country to shift the emphasis from taxes to other
policies. For instance, it is now widely accepted that certain types of
restrictive trade policies-although unjustified on economic grounds-
could trigger defensive investments to protect markets developed
through exports. 96 Trade policies that create uncertainty as to market
access of products from exporting countries might also generate FDI.
The current trends in Japanese investment in the United States seem to
confirm both these observations.9 7
The discussion in this section suggests that it may be instructive for
policymakers to investigate the relationship between various types of
government market intervention policies in the area of technology trans-
fer and the FDI process. Certain government policies can be designed to
encourage and facilitate FDI and the transfer of the appropriate technol-
ogy to specific industries. Such is the case where the policy targets the
industry, the technology, and the type of foreign investor.
Finally, much emphasis has been placed on the cost of labor as a
policy variable. However, it would appear that the efficiency and pro-
ductivity of labor might be, in some cases, a much more important factor
in FDI. The cheapness of labor alone is hardly sufficient to induce FDI,
since low-wage rates exist in several countries that nevertheless attract
little or negligible amounts of FDI. An important host country FDI in-
ducement policy for labor-intensive investments should include policies
for providing an efficient labor force or certain concessions for the train-
ing of labor by the MNE.
IV. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION THEORY
The industrial organization theory of FDI seeks to explain the
growth of the MNE and FDI behavior in terms of oligopolistic market
structures.98 According to this theory, the advantage of MNEs lies not
so much in the possession of some unique intangible asset or know-how
96 See Mundell, supra note 91. See also Horst, Optimal Behavior, supra note 32.
97 See generally the sources cited in connection with the General Motors-Toyota Joint Venture
supra note 95.
98 Caves, International Corporations: The Industrial Economics of Foreign Investment, 38
ECONOMICA 1 (1971).
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as it lies in the stable structural traits of the industries in which they
operate. Oligopoly with differentiated products based on technology pro-
tected by patents, or advertising protected by registered trademarks and
brand names, goes to the very root of the FDI process in horizontal in-
vestments. Oligopoly also provides a fundamental explanation of vertical
direct investments. 99
It should be stated here that the intangible assets hypothesis and the
industrial organization thesis are closely related yet somewhat distinct
theories. Whereas one is a specific case of a particular market failure, the
other is a general case of several industry-specific market imperfections
which explain the foreign investment process. According to the intangi-
ble assets hypothesis, the failure of the rental markets for know-how and
other firm-specific advantages explain why an MNE seeking the greatest
return on its intangible assets would invest in their use rather than grant
a license. However, the industrial organization theory considers the
rental-market imperfection simply as a set of several traits within the
industry, manifesting imperfections, which together explain the FDI be-
havior. Moreover, the two theories are connected in the sense that the
profitable exploitation of technology depends on some degree of monop-
oly. Monopoly power facilitates the generation and protection of pro-
duction secrets, superior technology, and their profitable use.
The industrial organization theory had its origins in a seminal doc-
toral dissertation by Stephen Hymer in 1960.1°° His major thesis was
that any attempt to explain the FDI behavior of MNEs must first explain
why MNEs control or seek to control their foreign operations.1 "1 The
answer, he thought, was related to the imperfections in the industrial
characteristics of the market and the rental markets for technology.
10 2
Ownership and control of these foreign operations would then permit the
MNEs to generate monopoly rents by removing competition. The sec-
ond reason why MNEs desire to control their foreign operations has
something to do with the imperfections in the rental markets.103 When
the markets for renting, assigning, or leasing firm-specific advantages are
characterized by imperfections, the MNE owning such advantages can-
not exploit fully the rents attributable to them. To such an MNE, it
would be most profitable to exploit its advantages abroad by establishing
and controlling its operations as opposed to renting them.
99 Id.
100 S. HYMER, supra note 59.
101 Id. at 23.
102 Id. at 25-26.
103 Id. at 26.
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Since Hymer's thesis, other economists such as Charles Kin-
dleberger,'° 4 Richard Caves, °5 and Frederick Knickerbocker10 6 have ex-
plored and refined the industrial organization theory into a well-
established explanation of the growth of the MNE and the FDI process.
The current and prevailing theory on the industrial organization ap-
proach is perhaps best exemplified by the writings of Caves. According
to Caves, once exports and licensing are ruled out as alternatives to ex-
ploiting firm-specific advantages, FDI must be explained by industry-spe-
cific factors.'0 7 That is, FDI tends to take place in industries
characterized by similar market structures both in the home and host
countries. One can observe similar industrial concentration or clustering
of foreign investors both at home and abroad. To determine which coun-
tries are potential sources for FDI, the following structural characteris-
tics in their industries would be instructive: oligopoly with product
differentiation; high R & D intensity geared towards knowledge creation;
and barriers to entry confronting competitors. 08
Although tariff barriers are not directly related to any industrial
characteristics of the source or host country, they nevertheless are a stim-
ulus to FDI because they tend to reinforce the market structures in the
host country. With seller concentration, high tariff barriers would en-
hance what may be characterized as a "herd mentality" in MNEs. When
one firm jumps these tariff barriers by creating a plant in the protected
foreign markets the rest will follow, since not doing so would place them
at a competitive disadvantage. That is, they could not effectively com-
pete with the first firm through their more expensive exports.
It is important at this stage to explain how these market structures
are determinants of FDI. Oligopolistic market structures describe a situ-
ation of seller concentration. Where an industry is dominated by a few
firms, product differentiation becomes an effective tool for the accretion
and control of market power. Product differentiation also provides the
oligopolist with an instrument for keeping competitors out of the market
both at home and abroad. Given their size, financial resources, and mar-
keting techniques, MNEs can more easily bear the significant costs asso-
ciated with product differentiation through advertising. Moreover, their
marketing techniques put them at a comparative advantage over compet-
104 C. KINDLEBERGER, AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD: Six LECTURES ON DIRECT INVEST-
MENT (1969).
105 R. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE, supra note 7.
106 F. KNICKERBOCKER, OLIGOPOLISTIC REACTION AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE (1973).
107 In a recent and interesting book, Caves has spelt out in greater detail the industrial organiza-
tion theory. See R. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE, supra note 7.
108 Id.
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itors, non-MNEs, and other potential foreign investors. These oligopolis-
tic advantages constitute significant barriers to entry. Moreover, the
legal protection accorded their industrial property rights in the form of
brand names, trademarks, and patents ensures that the oligopolists can
effectively control the degree of market penetration by firms or non-
MNEs without such advantages. Since these protections exist both at
home and abroad, 10 9 an MINE, for monopoly profits, would seek to ex-
ploit its protected advantages abroad within industries exhibiting the
same structural traits as at home.
The arguments pursued so far are closely related to barriers to en-
try,I" which make it more profitable for oligopolists to exploit their rent-
yielding, firm-specific advantages abroad. As long as barriers to entry
exist in particular industries, they are considered as providing a substan-
tial advantage to offset the costs of foreign production."' Moreover,




It may be useful to start this section with a statement on the ex-
pected relationships between the industrial characteristics and foreign in-
vestment behavior. Various forms of entry barriers, as stated earlier,
appear to give MNEs in oligopolistic industries a decided edge over non-
MNEs. Richard Caves concludes that "each source of barriers to entry
bears at least some relationship to the reasons why MNEs exist.""''1
They also explain why MNEs have an advantage "over newly organized
firms, or over single-nation firms in getting over these barriers to en-
try.""P1 4 One should then expect high entry barriers and foreign invest-
ment activities to be highly correlated. One should also expect a close
association between seller concentration and foreign investment
behavior.
Since the emergence of the industrial organization theory, the extent
of these relationships has been the subject of several empirical investiga-
tions. The results of some of these empirical studies have presented a
109 Most host and home countries are signatories to the Paris Convention on Patents and also
have the appropriate statutes protecting industrial rights. See, eg., PATENT THROUGHOUT THE
WORLD (A. Greene ed. 1975); J. BAXTER, WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE (1985).
110 R. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE, supra note 7, at 96.
111 See G. NANKANI, THE INTERCOUNTRY DISTRIBUTION OF DIRECT INVESTMENT IN MANU-
FACTURING 18 (1979).
112 R. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE, supra note 7, at 16.
113 id at 96.
114 Id.
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substantial amount of evidence confirming the relationship between seller
concentration and the FDI process. Such studies indicate that the links
between seller concentration and FDI appear to be universal to all
MNEs, irrespective of their national origins.15 The importance of seller
concentration to foreign investments was considered so high that Frank
Fishwick remarked that foreign investments are never prominent in non-
concentrated industries.116 It should, however, be pointed out that these
studies do not prove any direct causation between seller concentration
and FDI. They merely establish that there is a high degree of correlation
between entry barriers and FDI.
One of the earlier but important empirical studies on the relation-
ship between industry characteristics and FDI was by Frederick Knick-
erbocker. 117 According to Knickerbocker, one way to explain the foreign
investment behavior of MNEs in an oligopolistic industry is by oligo-
polistic reaction.' Firms in a loosely-knit oligopoly are mutually inter-
dependent. As such, the behavior of one firm is likely to trigger a
defensive response from its competitors. The decision to go abroad by
any firm in such an industry would induce a reaction similar to the "herd
mentality." The rest of the firms will almost instinctively follow the
leader. Hence, they checkmate the leaders' foreign investments to main-
tain their market share and competitive position.119 Thus, the foreign
investment activities of several firms in an oligopolistic market will be
determined by that of the leader. However, the determinants of the FDI
of the leader is based on the basic industrial organization theory. Thus,
oligopolistic reaction was designed to be a complementary explanation of
the FDI process. Knickerbocker found empirically that the bunching or
entry concentration of FDI was significantly correlated to industry con-
centration.1 20 In particular, entry concentration appeared to have been
associated with a few industry leaders and most intense in industries
where marketing capabilities were the most instrumental in the success of
115 The following are examples of studies pointing to the importance of seller concentration and
FDI process: J. DUNNING, AMERICAN INVESTMENT IN BRITISH MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 155
(1958); R. CAVES & T. PUGEL, INTRAINDUSTRY DIFFERENCES IN CONDUCT AND PERFORMANCE:
VIABLE STRATEGIES IN U.S. MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 100 (Monograph series in Finance and
Economics 1980); R. CAVES, M. PORTER, A. SPENCE, & J. SCOTT, COMPETITION IN THE OPEN
ECONOMY: A MODEL APPLIED TO CANADA 86-87 (1980).
116 F. FISHWICK, MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION IN EUROPE
43-44 (1982).
117 F. KNICKERBOCKER, supra note 106.
118 Id. at 5.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 59-61.
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firms.121 He also found that the post World War II expansion of United
States FDI exhibited this bunching characteristic. The tendency to
bunch together was greater the more an industry was characterized by
oligopolistic market structures.
1 22
Several other empirical studies have demonstrated the relationship
between other industrial characteristics, entry barriers, and FDI. For
instance, Thomas Horst, in a study of United States manufacturing in-
vestments in Canada, found that firm size, as measured either by the
volume of sales or assets, was a very important determining factor in
plant location.12 1 In fact, Horst concluded that "once inter-industry dif-
ferences are washed out, the only influence of truly separate significance
is firm size."124 He also found that the level of MNEs' R & D expendi-
tures in the industry as it relates to their United States sales was impor-
tant in determining United States FDI in Canada. 2 5 However, the R &
D expenditure was taken as a proxy for product differentiation. The
combination of firm size, technology creation capabilities, and product
differentiation, as an important entry barrier, appears to have been con-
firmed here. Furthermore, Horst's research appears to have been vali-
dated by Bernard Wolf in a study of global United States manufacturing
investment behavior.12 6 Wolf also found that two major catalysts to
United States manufacturing FDI globally have been firm size and tech-
nical know-how. 127 Several other studies by economists stressing various
aspects of the industrial organization theory seem to confirm their ex-
planatory powers of the FDI process"' not only in horizontal invest-
ments but also in vertical investments. 129
B. Industrial Organization and Political Economy
The industrial organization theory, unlike other theories, presents
an important aspect of the political economy of MNEs and FDI. For-
eign direct investments, it is argued, may pose serious political and policy
problems to host governments. Due to the size of MNEs and the manner
in which the MNE system works, host governments may lose control
121 Id. at 60.
122 Id. at 78.
123 Horst, An Empirical Study, supra note 55, at 260.
124 Id. at 261.
125 Id.
126 Wolf, Industrial Diversification and Internationalization: Some Empirical Evidence, 26 J. IN-
DUS. ECON. 177, 186 (1977).
127 Id. at 189.
128 See, eg., Lall, Monopolistic Advantages, supra note 75, at 102.
129 R. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE, supra note 7, at 125-27.
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over important sectors of their economies. Thus, FDI incentive policies
might well complicate these political questions.
The issue of the political economy of FDI has been investigated by
several economists. For example, Richard Newfarmer and Willard
Mueller explored the impact of seller concentration at home and abroad
on denationalization13 ° in developing countries. Since seller concentra-
tion in the home country generally measures the market power of indus-
try participants, the fact that it is replicated in the host country, also
implies the transfer of such market power. 131 Therefore, FDI carries
with it some market power based upon size or the accretion of size. The
transfer of this market power to the host country permits the MNE to
exercise some control over the host country's economy either directly or
indirectly. 132
Studies on denationalization, market power, and several of the de-
pendency-type analyses133 raise interesting and important questions
about the political economy of the MNE and planning policy options for
host developing countries. Although these studies are extensive and
complex, we are only interested in a limited issue raised by them. For
example, what should be the nature or form of the host country's FDI
legislation or policies given that the MNE can sometimes engulf the host
country in controversies with wide-ranging implications? Current con-
130 R. NEWFARMER & W. MUELLER, supra note 33.
131 Connor & Mueller, Manufacturing Denationalization and Market Structure: Brazil, Mexico
and the United States, 6 INDUS. ORG. REV. 86, 87 (1978).
132 Id. See also R. NEWFARMER & W. MUELLER, supra note 33, at 43-44.
133 Dependency theorists do not constitute one group. The reference to dependency analyses,
therefore, seeks to put together several intellectuals and methods of analyses which might be differ-
ent when looked at separately and closely. See, e.g., Sunkel, Big Business and Dependencies, 40
FOREIGN AFF. 517 (1972). For an interesting synthesis of the dependency literature, see Chilcote,
Dependency: A Critical Synthesis of the Literature, 1 LATIN AM. PERSP. 4 (1974); see also P. BARAN,
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH (1975); P. BARAN, MONOPOLY CAPITAL (1966); Senghaas,
Multinational Corporations and the Third World: On the Problem of the Further Integration of Pe-
ripheries into the Given Structure of the International Economic System, 12 J. PEACE RESEARCH 257
(1975); A. EMMANUEL, UNEQUAL EXCHANGE: A SURVEY OF THE IMPERIALISM OF TRADE
(1972); A. FRANK, CRISIS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1980); H. MAGDOFF, THE AGE OF IMPERI-
ALISM: THE ECONOMICS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1969). For an interesting critique of imperial-
ism, see B. COHEN, THE QUESTION OF IMPERIALISM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DOMINANCE
AND DEPENDENCE (1973). See also Galtung, A Structural Theory of Imperialism, 8 J. PEACE RE-
SEARCH 81, 82 (1971); S. AMIN, CLASS AND NATION, HISTORICALLY AND IN THE CURRENT CRI-
SIS 11045 (1980); S. AMIN, ACCUMULATION ON A WORLD SCALE: A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY
oF UNDERDEVELOPMENT (1974); S. AMIN, UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT: AN ESSAY ON THE SOCIAL
FORMATIONS OF PERIPHERAL CAPITALISM (1976). See also Block, The Ruling Class Does Not
Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of State, 33 SOCIALIST REV. 6, 8 (1977). See generally Cox,
Ideologies and the New International Economc Order: Reflections on Some Recent Literature, 33
INT'L ORG. 257 (1979).
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troversies surrounding the MNE have involved legal,1 34 economic,135 and
political136 considerations of nation states involved in the MNE system.
Thus, a host developing country might suddenly find itself involved in an
MNE-generated controversy on issues ranging from its own national eco-
nomic policies to the geo-political or national security concerns of a for-
eign state.
For most developing countries seeking to attract FDI these concerns
might be only academic. However, for those countries that have been
most attractive to the MNE such as Brazil, Mexico, and South Korea,
these considerations could be important in adopting well-balanced laws
for attracting FDI. They are also equally important for countries that
have not been very attractive to FDI but have, to some extent, permitted
issues of the political economy of FDI to dominate their policies, perhaps
to the detriment of other policies. The relevance of these factors is dis-
cussed in the next section.
C. Incentive Policy Implications
Given the possible serious problems that might arise in relation to
the political economy, denationalization, and the power of MNEs, it is
immediately doubtful whether host countries, particularly host develop-
ing countries, should engage in any systematic inducement of FDI.
134 See generally Thompson, United States Jurisdiction Over Foreign Subsidiaries: Corporate and
International Law Aspects, 15 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 319 (1983); Tittmann, Extraterritorial Ap-
plication of US. Export Control Laws on Foreign Subsidiaries of U.S. Corporations: An American
Lawyer's View from Europe, 16 INT'L LAw. 730 (1982); Marcuss & Richard, Extraterritorial Juris-
diction in United States Trade Law: The Need for a Consistent Theory, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 439 (1981); Fruehauf Corp. v. Massady, Court of Appeals of Paris, France, 14th Chamber (1965),
reprinted in 5 INT'L LEGAL MATE RALS 476 (1966). See also The International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1906 (Supp. III 1979); Export Administration Act of
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (1969); Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 2407 (Supp. III 1979); Export Administration Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 121 (1985);
Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 95a,
50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-39 (1976 & Supp. V 1982). See also Transaction Control Regulations, 31
C.F.R. §§ 500.102-206, 500.329(a) (1984). See also 15 C.F.R. §§ 371-74 (1985).
135 See Common Market Challenges U.S. Policies on Trade as Economic Relations Worsen, Wall
St. J., July 1, 1982, at 4, col. 2; French Firm Loses Bid in U.S. Courts to Block Gas Pipeline Sanctions,
wall St. J., Oct. 10, 1982, at 23, col. 1; Canada May Challenge Sanctions Set by U.S. on Soviet
Pipelines, Wall St. J., Aug. 10, 1982, at 42, col. 1. See also Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterri-
torial Jurisdiction, 31 Am. J. COMp. L. 579 (1983).
136 See, eg., the following blocking statutes from some of the capital exporting countries: The
United Kingdom: Protection of Trading Interests Act (1980); France: Law No. 80-538, 1980 J.O.;
Canada: Uranium Information Security Regulation, CAN. STAT. 0 & REGS. 76-644 (P.C. 1976-
2368, Sept. 21, 1976), promulgated under the authority of Atomic Energy Control Act, CAN. Rv.
STAT. ch. A-19 (1970); Australia: Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act,
AusT.. AcTs, No. 121 (1976). See also Batista, Confronting Foreign Blocking Legislation: A Guide
to Securing Disclosure from Non-Resident Parties to American Litigation, 17 INT'L LAW. 61 (1983).
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The presence of MNEs in a host country often drastically changes
the political and economic calculus of that country. MNE operations do
not only often generate a volatile chemistry in the environment, but they
also touch upon the very sensitive nerves of those who want them. The
question then is: should a host country, without the necessary power or
institutional framework for checking the conduct of MNEs, engage in a
policy that will result in the loss of control over its industrial and eco-
nomic decision-making process? In the alternative, should such a coun-
try at least be willing to reduce its policy autonomy or efficacy by
enticing MNEs whose global strategies and decision flexibility would
tend to thwart that country's policy efforts?
The answer to these questions hardly requires economic analysis or
pure and simple legal arguments. It requires a fairly sophisticated under-
standing of the MNE system, the areas of conflict, the cost and benefits
resulting from MNE activities, and the general international environ-
ment. This section will explore the possible incentive policy implications
of the industrial organization theory against the background of the socio-
economic and political implications of the MNE.
1. Control and FDI Policy
The fundamental thesis of the industrial organization theory is that
MNEs engage in FDI because they seek ownership and control of their
operations in foreign countries. The reason why they control or seek to
control these operations is that several market imperfections make it dif-
ficult for MNEs to make the greatest returns on their firm-specific advan-
tages in any normal arms-length transactions in the external markets.
Foreign investments, therefore, tend to take place in industries character-
ized by certain imperfect market structures both at home and abroad
that would increase the returns to MNEs beyond normal profits. In
other words, industries characterized by oligopoly, product differentia-
tion, high R & D intensity, and barriers to entry would most likely be
both the source and destination of foreign investments. It is clear, there-
fore, that one of the reasons for FDI is control.
Any search for the appropriate industrial policy options of host
countries should begin with the issue of control. If ownership and con-
trol is central to the MNE as an MNE, then one should observe a
marked preference for MNEs to cluster around countries in which the
opportunity to control their operations is greatest. According to the in-
dustrial organization theory, the more permissive the host country's en-
vironment towards greater control of FDI by MNEs, the more favorable
that environment should be to MNEs. Therefore, one should expect a
Alternatives to Tax Incentive Policies
7:208(1985)
significant and positive correlation between host country legal permis-
siveness and flexibility towards control and MNE involvement in that
country. A policy that permits at least majority-owned and at most
wholly-owned MNE subsidiaries should be desirable for FDI. Under
either situation, the MNE can exercise de jure and de facto control over
its operations. It can decide production levels, the price of intra-firm
transactions, royalty rates, markets to be serviced, and every other aspect
of its operation without interruptions from the host government or its
local partners. Accordingly, a legislative policy that does not permit
these ownership and control structures is more likely to discourage FDI.
The idea of using ownership and control as an incentive policy in-
strument is a novel idea which deserves special scrutiny. It should be
emphasized that, so far, host country incentive policies do not appear to
incorporate this option. Nor has the literature on incentives investigated
the possibility of using ownership and control as a means of attracting
FDI. The reasons why this option has escaped the literature might be
partly due to the political economy of MNE discussed earlier, the eco-
nomic nationalism of host countries, and the complexity of the issue of
ownership and control. Therefore, to develop any incentive policy pre-
scriptions, it is important to analyze in some detail the issue of ownership
and control. It is also important to find out host countries' attitudes to-
ward ownership and control and how MNEs respond to different
attitudes.
2. Attitudes of Host Countries
The issue of control is a very complex phenomenon that transcends
any classification of nation states by ideological, economic, or political
power.1 37 Whether a nation state should permit foreign ownership of its
economic resources or means of production in its industries raises very
important questions including the very existence of such a country as an
independent sovereign state. Nation states are thought of as sovereign
territorial units concerned primarily with the welfare of their citizens.
Economic nationalism, therefore, appears to be logical for the exercise of
real sovereignty-political and economic. Foreign ownership and con-
trol, depending upon its character, depth, and shape may not only im-
137 Economic nationalism has always been a phenomenon that transends the level of economic
development or political ideology of countries. These concerns are expressed in various ways. See
Hearings on United States Policy Toward International Investment Before the Senate Comm. on For-
eign Relations, Subcomm. on International Economic Policy, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982); OECD,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: MID-TERM REPORT ON 1976
DECLARATION AND DECISIONS (1982); UNCTC, THIRD SURVEY, supra note 1, at 79-87. See also
C. BERGSTEN, T. HORST & T. MORAN, supra note 26.
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pinge upon the exercise of sovereignty but may also negate it completely.
In such a situation, the concern of nation states is that they may become
psuedo-sovereign states absorbed in the economic space of more powerful
trading partners. Under such circumstances they may effectively cease to
have the capability of serving the best interests of their citizens.
In the past fifteen years, political considerations and ownership and
control have increasingly gained the attention of both developed and de-
veloping host countries. 38 Foreign ownership and control are seen as
exposing host countries to the vicarious dependence on foreign govern-
ment policies through foreign investors. This limits the policy autonomy
of host countries. At the same time, reliance on foreigners in important
industries exposes host countries to important concerns of vulnerability
and sensitivity dependence.1 39 The host country is thus hardly able to
absorb the shocks of major international disturbances in dependent in-
dustries. The prospect of not being able to respond through domestic
policy to changes in the international economy appears unpalatable to
host governments. Moreover, host countries see a need for self-reliance,
promoting local entrepreneurship and encouraging certain distribution
patterns.
In view of these considerations, there now appears to be a growing
convergence in policies on control adopted by developed market econo-
mies and developing countries. Recent policy changes in Canada,
France, Australia-and the ever-mounting pressure in the United
States""4 to end its policy of indiscriminate neutrality towards certain
types of FDI and to require monitoring of FDI-indicates a new trend.
In the case of developing countries, several policy patterns have emerged,
ranging from legislation restricting foreign ownership and control in pri-
ority, pioneer, or promoted industries, to general rules of law restricting
foreign ownership and control. 4 ' Although the specific approaches of
developing countries are numerous, for the purpose of discussion, one
can categorize them into two broad groups. First, there are those coun-
tries that have tried to control only the operations and intra-firm transac-
tions without prescribing ownership structures. Second, there are others
that have combined operational and intra-firm transactional controls
with specified ownership structures.
Influenced by a more sophisticated understanding of the political
138 UNCTC, THIRD SURVEY, supra note 1, at 60, 70.
139 See Koahane, The International Political Economy of the 1980s, in TARIFFS, QUOTAS, AND
TRADE: THE POLITICS OF PROTECTIONISM 163, 167 (1979).
140 UNCTC, THIRD SURVEY, supra note 1, at 78-82. See also OECD, CONTROLS AND IMPEDI-
MENTS AFFECTING INWARD DIRECT INVESTMENT IN OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES (1982).
141 UNCTC, THIRD SURVEY, supra note 1, at 60.
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economy of the MNE and its operational dynamics, countries in the first
category appear to draw the important distinction between ownership of
the operational resources and control over their use. Ownership of the
operations by MNEs Per se does not raise questions about allocative and
distributive efficiencies in an economy. It is how these operations are
controlled or managed that might raise serious questions about the effi-
cient utilization of resources and distributive equities. The extent to
which management is responsive to contradictory home country policies
intensifies the concern over sovereignty. Some countries, such as Brazil
and others in Latin America, have introduced very complex and sophisti-
cated regulatory schemes designed to monitor transactions within the
MNE system and control the channels of transmission and flow of prof-
its, dividends, fees, and other charges within the system.142 A number of
studies on these regulatory schemes point out that, even though they
might have been motivated by a sophisticated understanding of the MNE
system, they were ad hoc and uncoordinated in nature. 143 Consequently,
they were ineffective. Moreover, their efficiency was further undermined
by the unavailability of sufficient enforcement resources.
144
The second category of regulatory schemes appears to be most prev-
alent in developing countries. Countries such as Ghana and Nigeria in-
troduced various regulatory schemes starting with controls over transfer
pricing, remittances, and requiring local participation by statute.145 Lo-
cal participation statutes were motivated by many factors. Several of the
142 For examples from Brazil, see Foreign Capital Inducement Law No. 4.131 of 3 Sept. 1962 (as
amended by Law No. 4.390 of 29 Aug. 1964); Executive Act No. 55.762 of 17 Feb. 1965 (consolidat-
ing Law No. 4.131 of 3 Sept. 1962 and Law No. 4.390 of Aug. 1964); Normative Act No. 15 of Sept.
11, 1975; and Normative Act No. 64 of Sept. 16, 1983. For examples from Columbia, see Decree
1900 of 1972, (implementing Decision 24 of the Andean Common Market concerning the treatment
of FDI, patents, trademarks and royalties); Law 55 of 1975 (restricting new investments in banking);
and Finance Technology transfer laws-to be found in Decree 444 of 1967, Decree 688 of 1967, and
Decree 1234 of 1972. For examples from Mexico, see Law for the Promotion of Mexican Invest-
ment and Regulation of Foreign Investment, 1973; Law Concerning the Control and Registration of
the Transfer of Technology and the Use and Exploitation of Patents and Trademarks, 1981; Law on
Inventions and Trademarks, 1976. The United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations has
recently compiled a list of the appropriate legislation aftfecting FDI in these and other countries. See
UNCTC, NATIONAL LEGISLATION, supra note 2.
143 See Rosenn, Regulation of Foreign Investment in Brazil: A CriticalAnalysis, 15 LAw. AMERI-
CAS 307 (1983); Correa, Transfer of Technology in Latin America, 16 J. WORLD TRADE L. 388
(1981); Inneadella, The Foreign Investment Laws of Latin America: Present and Future, 16 INT'L
LAw. 463 (1982); Wilner, The Transfer of Technology to Latin America, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 269 (1981); Bledel, The Latin America Development Process and the New Legislative Trends, 10
GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 352 (1980).
144 Rosenn, supra note 143, at 352-54; Correa, supra note 143, at 408.
145 For Ghana, see the Investment Policy Decree, 1975 (NRCD329). Since this Decree, Ghana
has enacted other laws designed to encourage FDI. The most recent legislation is the Investment
Code, 1985 (P.N.D.C.L. 116) which repealed the Investment Code, 1981 (Act 437). For Nigeria, see
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host governments seriously concerned about the nature, quality, and im-
pact of MNE activities on their economies decided to induce greater and
more efficient integration of MNE operations into their local economies
through legislation. MNE operations, they thought, would be most ben-
eficial to them if they generated greater linkage effects and resulted in
better and more efficient local resource utilization.
To ensure that MNE operational decisions would take into account
national industrial and economic policies, output targets, export levels,
and even the balance of payment positions, those host governments en-
acted local participation laws which demanded majority local ownership
of MNE operations within their countries. These types of laws have be-
come commonplace. They exist within several countries in Southeast
Asia, Africa, and Latin America.'46 Such host governments seem to be-
lieve that the simple fact of local majority ownership, dictated by law,
will translate into effective control. According to the theory, those laws
should discourage FDI. However, the real question is: what is their im-
pact on the behavior of MNEs? Do these legislated local majority own-
erships translate into effective control by local individuals, and hence the
achievement of host government objectives?
3. MNE Responses to Ownership and Control Laws
The extent to which ownership and control laws of the type de-
scribed above have been effective depends upon the behavior of MNEs.
Until about the last decade, there appeared to have been a definite prefer-
ence of most MNEs (particularly United States MNEs) for wholly- or
majority-owned operations in developing countries. MNEs in more re-
cent times have demonstrated greater flexibility with regard to ownership
and control. There is a growing trend toward accepting minority owner-
ship positions of FDI in developing countries. However, that an MNE
holds a minority interest is not always dispositive of the locus of control.
A United Nations report on MNEs indicates that, notwithstanding their
minority equity positions, MNEs still exercise substantial de facto con-
trol over their operations.147
In a recent survey on this issue, it was found that the experience of
several countries in legislating control has been unsuccessful.' 48 MNEs
from Europe, Japan, and the United States all seemed to find a way
The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act (1977) (A/63), (Decree No. 3), generally known as the
1977 Indigenization Act.
146 See supra notes 84-87.
147 UNCTC, THIRD SURVEY, supra note 1, at 62-64, 163.
148 See Yelpaala, Impact of Industrial Legislation, supra note 20.
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around local majority participation statutes to maintain effective control,
at least over very critical aspects of their operations. 149 Moreover, the
local majority owner does not always care about legal right of control.
Most often the local owner still needs the MNE because it has the re-
sources, access to markets, and an international or global network. For
profitable operations, the local majority owner usually relies on the
MNE, resulting in relinquishment of effective control. Several other
studies have confirmed the importance of the issue of control to MNEs
even though legal ownership may be declining in importance. 150 MNEs
operating in Nigeria, for example, have adopted schemes, structural reor-
ganizations, and several other methods to maintain control which were
violative of the spirit and letter of the Nigerian Indigenization Decree. 5'
For instance, an MNE manufacturing for local distribution would divide
its operations into two parts: (1) manufacturing, which would be wholly-
owned by the MNE; and (2) marketing and distributing, a joint venture
in which the MNE would take a minority interest but find local partners
who are known to be incompatible with one another. The two companies
would be in the same building and share the same board of directors and
officers.1 2 As such, the MNE would maintain an effective control over
its entire operations notwithstanding the law.
What is obvious from the Nigerian experience is that majority local
participation statutes, by their nature, stress ownership and not effective
control. They confer only the legal right of control whereas the effective-
ness of the right is determined by other extraneous and non-legal factors.
Thus, the local majority owner might not have the know-how, manage-
rial expertise, or operational experience to run the operation efficiently.
Moreover, the industries normally targeted for local majority ownership
are the same industries in which the MNEs enjoy a decided monopolistic
advantage over the local partner. Such an advantage would often be used
subtly to control the operations effectively. Therefore, several of the host
country's desires for economic independence and policy autonomy re-
main mere wishes and somewhat elusive.
D. Policy Prescriptions
The response of MNEs to various regulatory schemes of host coun-
149 Id.
150 T. BIERSTEKER, DISTORTION OR DEVELOPMENT?: CONTENDING PERSPECTIVES ON THE
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION (1978); Biersteker, The Illusion of State Power Transnational Cor-
porations and Neutralization of Host-Country Legislation, 17 J. PEACE RESEARCH 207 (1980) [here-
inafter Biersteker, Illusion].
151 Biersteker, Illusion, supra note 150, at 215-18.
152 This is what Biersteker calls the two company strategy. IaL at 216.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 7:208(1985)
tries indicates quite clearly how adaptable MNEs can be in the face of a
changing legal environment. It also suggests that MNEs attach a great
deal of importance to the issue of control. They quickly recognize the
distinction between legal control and effective or operational control and
tend to accept situations where the effectiveness of control is maintained
by them. In terms of developing incentives for FDI, the apparent policy
prescription for host countries would then be to denationalize FDI oper-
ations by repealing all the MNE control legislation or by setting up own-
ership laws which do not interfere with the desired MNE effective
control.
This policy prescription is dubious for a number of reasons. First,
one wonders whether control and FDI are necessarily inseparable con-
cepts. Control, according to Stephen Hymer, is only a means to an
end-maximizing returns on firm-specific advantages within certain im-
perfect market structures. Control might well be a means to monopoly
profits. It might also be a statement of the level of uncertainty in a par-
ticular environment in which the MNEs operate. If MNEs control their
operations to maximize profits, the lack of control need not result in
lower levels of FDI since the loss of control does not necessarily imply
lesser returns. Moreover, as discussed under the intangible assets hy-
pothesis, controlling MNE operations in industries characterized by sev-
eral market imperfections should result in optimal levels of FDI and
allocative efficiencies in host countries. Besides, the growing number of
joint venture operations between different MNEs in the developed mar-
ket economies seems to suggest that control is not essential to foreign
operations of MNEs since at least some of them normally would take a
minority position in those operations. The desire for control might then
be a manifestation of some uncertainty about targeted profit levels or
some other problem within the environment of the host country.
Whether MNE control would work as an incentive for FDI would,
therefore, depend upon the nature of the markets within which MNEs
operate. The more imperfect the markets, the more effective control
would act as an incentive in the FDI process. Market imperfections
would tend to increase the level of uncertainty reflected in the cost of the
business environment, thereby requiring MNE control for efficiency and
profitability. In addition, the existence of certain forms of uncertainty
would require at least effective control to induce FDI. Where, for exam-
ple, the operational utility of FDI is dependent upon uncertain levels of
local capabilities, scale, efficiency, and quality for the product to be inter-
nationally competitive, effective control might operate to induce FDI.
Such a policy could then be complementary to the technology policy dis-
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cussed earlier. However, market imperfections in certain industries may
also require local control. This is most evident in the extractive indus-
tries. The MNE might be encouraged to invest without control when
most of the risk in the long-run is borne by the host country. That seems
to explain production sharing, service contracts, and staging in mineral
contracts.
Since MNEs have shown a remarkable adaptability in the area of
ownership and control, and host governments have continued to express
concern over the degree of asymmetrical vulnerability dependence on
foreign participation in their local economies, breaking down the FDI
package could lead to an accommodation on the issue of control with
respect to both the host governments and MNEs. As demonstrated ear-
lier, host governments' policy objectives are multiple. A government
might want ownership and control over a manufacturing industry be-
cause it wants to encourage the acquisition of technology or managerial
expertise. It might want local control in an industry that produces an
important manufactured export product. A country might also want to
develop competent local capability in an industry requiring a capital-in-
tensive and complex technology as in the case of the chemical and pe-
trochemical industries. The policy and strategy for ownership and
control in these cases could depend upon the availability of suitably
trained technicians and management either locally or internationally for
hire. On the other hand, the MNE might see control as essential for
monitoring a new technology, maintaining product quality, or even for
ensuring that the particular operations fit into the MNE system. These
goals are not all necessarily inconsistent with those of the host
government.
It appears that the issue of control could be used as an incentive for
FDI by host governments. For instance, a policy encouraging foreign
joint venture operations in an industry where local control is desired
could be achieved in different ways. The host government could use a
fade-out, production sharing, service, or management contracts effec-
tively as incentives. In the case of manufactured exports, the MNE may
only invest if it has control over the manufacturing process for quality
reasons. A fade-out policy can accommodate the MNE concerns where
it is allowed to control the operations, but to phase-out such control to
suitably-trained local management within a definite amount of time. In
the alternative, the policy could allow MNE control over only the manu-
facturing process subject to a fade-out scheme. This approach should
result in allowing MNE temporary control over crucial aspects of FDI
operations where productivity, efficiency, and quality will be enhanced in
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 7:208(1985)
the short- and long-term. The host government, the local partner, and
the MNE all stand to benefit from his policy. In fact, for this approach
to be effective, it would require a well-developed industrial policy which
either targets or ranks various industries for development and foreign
participation. It should result in some pragmatic response to the type,
timing, and process of effective control by local entrepreneurs. Because
the terms will be negotiated and will constitute part of the government's
policy for encouraging FDI, the approach should decrease the uncer-
tainty to MNEs, stabilize their FDI expectations, and induce FDI as a
whole.
Finally, any attempt to address squarely the issue of control, cer-
tainly one of the most important concerns of MNEs, will be beneficial to
both the host government and the MNE. At least, the host government
would again be actively involved in the FDI process. The experience of
several countries suggests that active involvement might be very impor-
tant for the type, size, timing, and control over FDI.1" This policy pre-
scription is likely to be unpopular because of the issue of monopoly rents
and the politico-economic ramifications of denationalization. However,
an efficient use of this policy option must be put within the context of a
host country's short- and long-term economic objectives. It might be ef-
fectively used where the host country develops some capability to effec-
tively monitor aspects of MNE operations such as profits and intra-firm
transactions. On efficiency grounds, therefore, various local statutes
seeking to reduce inefficiencies in the market by controlling MNE intra-
firm transactions are well-motivated. However, these regulatory schemes
should be such that they do not interfere with host governments' indus-
trial policies and operational efficiencies. Ownership and control struc-
tures should then encourage maximum and efficient resource utilization
and output levels within the context of host countries' distribution goals.
E. Other Policy Issues
The industrial organization theory also posits that certain industrial
traits at home and abroad induce FDI.' 54 With regard to developing
host country policies, it is important to determine whether the industrial
traits work as a pull from or a push toward the host country. In other
words, which market structures are most active in generating FDI be-
havior, those of the home or host countries? Are market imperfections of
the home needed first to serve as a push of FDI to the host country?
From the literature surveyed so far, it would appear that the indus-
153 Yelpaala, Impact of Industrial Legislation, supra note 20.
154 Caves, supra note 98, at 24.
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try specific characteristics of the home country serve as a push while
those of the host country serve as a pull for FDI. According to the the-
ory, MNEs seek to replicate their home country industrial traits and
market structures abroad. By accomplishing this, they can then easily
exploit the monopolistic advantages which were the basis for their mar-
ket power at home. Sanjaya Lall has suggested that MNEs have monop-
olistic advantages at home which may be transferable to the host
country.155 Therefore, it would appear that an oligopolistic market
structure in the home country would be a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for FDI. Where the host country has no policy of restricting
FDI, and the opportunity to replicate the industrial characteristics and
exploit the monopolistic advantages exist, the market structure of the
host country will serve as a pull for FDI. As long as the opportunities
exist in the host country for MNEs to reap monopoly profits or to main-
tain their relative market positions, why should the host country also be
called upon to induce FDI through tax incentives or other subsidies?
With the transferable monopolistic advantages at home and the profita-
ble opportunity to exploit them abroad (along the lines discussed in the
theory) the necessary push and pull exist and no incentives are required,
at least not tax incentives.
In fact, intuitively, the basic thesis of the theory militates against tax
incentives. Seller concentration generally is indicative of the market
power of MNEs. Given their dominant position in the host country's
economy or the potential for it, they may charge monopoly prices and
reap excess profits. Take, for instance, the several and different types of
intra-firm transactions that could be used to increase the returns to a
parent company, as discussed earlier. When these are taken together
with the potential for excess profits, there is no reason to offer incentives
to increase these returns to the MNEs. In fact, Richard Caves suggested
that, when excess profits are earned, host countries should impose an
excess profits tax.156 Since the MNE and its activities are a result of
market imperfections generated at home which may lead to economic
and political power abroad, it is doubtful whether host countries should
create a permissive environment that would complicate their policy op-
tions. Based on the basic tenets of the theory, tax incentives would be
both misplaced and redundant.
The argument is further strengthened by Fredrick Knickerbocker's
findings of oligopolistic reaction.157 If foreign investors have a kind of a
155 Lall, Monopolistic Advantages, supra note 75, at 102.
156 Caves, supra note 98, at 24.
157 F. KNICKERBOCKER, supra note 106, at 5.
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"herd mentality," all that is required is to induce the first MNE and the
rest would follow. The first MNE will not move, however, unless it can
replicate and exploit its monopolistic advantages abroad. Tax incentives
merely increase the monopoly returns and speed up the process. There-
fore, tax incentives are not effective as an inducement but are only rele-
vant, perhaps, as to the timing.
It would appear that certain host country policies could induce FDI
under this theory even if the desirability of doing so is in doubt. The
possession of technology, trademarks, brand names, and other industrial
properties protected by law give MNEs the opportunity to control their
entrepreneurial resources and create an effective barrier to entry. This
implies that both the home and host countries should have effective in-
dustrial property protection laws which can give MNEs some monopoly
power to exploit their know-how and effectively differentiate their prod-
ucts from others. These laws would assist MNEs in the erection of the
necessary barriers to entry and hence give them the opportunity to reap
monopoly or near-monopoly rents. Where effective entry barriers exist,
either through inducement or not, MNEs would be inclined to exploit
their monopolistic advantages in the host country. However, from a
cost-benefit perspective the host government might consider counter-
vailing disincentives to monopoly prices both in the goods and rental
markets. The host country may set limits on rents, royalties, and fees
chargeable on the transfer of know-how, management, and technical ser-
vice agreements to subsidiaries as has been done, for example, in Brazil.
It may also institute effective accounting control systems and subject mo-
nopoly profits to excess profits taxes.
Another area of possible host government policy is in the creation of
technology. As shown earlier, there is a positive and strong relationship
between technology intensity and FDI. Industries that are characterized
by heavy expenditures in knowledge creation are also very active in for-
eign investments. One then wonders whether host countries should not
play an active and aggressive role in the R & D component of FDI.
Given the growing concern of several host developing countries over the
appropriateness of technology, host countries should seek to influence
the technology that enters the FDI at the R & D, or adaptation stage.
Government subsidies on specific technology development based upon
host country or regional needs might be appropriate. These incentives
would relate to the cost of technology development. That is the most
appropriate stage to influence the nature of the technology that enters the
host country's industry.
It should be stressed that these types of host government subsidies
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alone would not be sufficient for FDI since the theory suggests several
other elements. In addition, the financial resources of MNEs are com-
paratively much larger than certain host countries, thereby raising the
question of the appropriateness of these subsidies in relation to the finan-
cial ability of host countries. The quest for monopoly profits, however, is
not likely to take MNEs to such countries. Besides, any attempt by host
countries to actively participate in the direction and nature of their eco-
nomic fate is required. Even if such an attempt is ineffective in the short
run, it will nevertheless help to focus attention on the most important
policy issues and areas of conflict.
Finally, in trying to determine the incentive policy implications, it is
also important to keep in mind another crucial element: the flow of FDI
occurs between similar industries even though diversification across the
industry is not impossible. This implies that any incentive policies
should be industry specific. Host countries should focus their FDI in-
ducement efforts at specific characteristics of industries seen as important
to their industrial development. This approach provides some flexibility
to the host government in the choice of its policy instruments and the
selection of beneficiary firms. It would also reduce the cost of the incen-
tives and possibly eliminate redundancy.
F. Summary
The industrial organization theory permits a serious investigation of
the policy dilemmas of host countries seeking economic development and
independence through FDI in a world of MNEs dictated by free enter-
prise and perfect competition. For the purposes of incentive policies, the
fundamental tenets of the industrial organization theory do not a priori
suggest any tax incentive policies for FDI. In fact, they suggest a possi-
ble excess profit tax on FDI monopoly income. However, under this the-
ory, certain industrial traits may present some policy options for host
countries.
If MNEs actually prefer to invest in industries characterized by cer-
tain market imperfections and also to own and control their foreign oper-
ations because of these market imperfections, then policies designed to
encourage FDI should focus on either the market imperfections or own-
ership and control. Market conditions in the world are generally charac-
terized by these imperfections, thereby suggesting that host countries
need not do anything. However, in the case of ownership and control,
the theory suggests denationalization or policies that would encourage
foreign ownership and control. The issue of ownership and control is,
nonetheless, so complex that this policy prescription is not necessarily
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appropriate. In view of the political economic heat that the MNE often
generates in the host country, and various host country industrial and
distribution policies, ownership and control can be used as a means of
encouraging certain types of FDI. In addition, the host country might
try to encourage certain initial technology creation activities and improve
its protection of industrial property rights.
V. INTERNALIZATION THEORY OF FDI
Internalization is the most ambitious recent attempt to develop a
comprehensive, complementary, or eclectic theory of the FDI process.
As a concept, internalization was first developed by R.H. Coase in 1937
to explain the process in the domestic context.158 The theory, however,
provides some basis for explaining the motivation for FDI and the
growth of the MNE. It was synthesized by Peter Buckley and Mark
Casson, 159 used by John Dunning to explain his eclectic approach to
FDI,10 and systematically developed into a general theory of FDI by
Alan Rugman. 161 According to Dunning, no theory standing alone can
explain such a complex phenomenon as the FDI process. 162 All the ma-
jor theories of FDI must be seen as complementary to one another under
the unifying theoretical theme of internalization.
Internalization may be defined as bringing under the same owner-
ship and control, the same activities linked together by markets. The
firm, according to the internalization theory, is "an organization for allo-
cating resources without the exchange of ownership. ' 163 There are two
sets of markets within which a firm may transact its business: the exter-
nal markets and the internal markets. External markets refer to market
transactions involving arms-length deals which result in the exchange of
ownership. On the other hand, internal markets concern deals which are
merely notional and in which ownership does not change. 164 Internaliza-
tion will take place in response to any type of distortion or market imper-
fections in the external goods and factor markets. 165  The basic
motivation behind internalization is efficiency. The operational efficiency
of any business requires that it be able to coordinate various aspects of its
158 Coase, supra note 59, at 386.
159 p. BUCKLEY & M. CASSON, supra note 35.
160 J. DUNNING, INT'L PROD., supra note 37.
161 Rugman, Internalization as a General Theory of Foreign Direct Investment: A Re-appraisal of
the Literature, 116 WELTWIRTSCHAFrLICHEs ARCHIV. 365 (1980).
162 J. DUNNING, INT'L PROD., supra note 37, at 33.
163 See M. CASSON, supra note 65, at 45.
164 Id.
165 P. BUCKLEY & M. CASSON, supra note 35, at 36-37.
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activities through a set of efficient external markets-in the goods and
factor markets. However, the markets for several intermediate products,
defined broadly to include intangible assets, human skills, knowledge,
and semi-finished products, are either inefficient or difficult to organize.
Internalization permits a firm to by-pass these inefficiencies or replace
them with its own internal efficient set of markets. It is, therefore, the
internalization across national boundaries that explains foreign produc-
tion, sales, and other operations of MNEs. 166 The result of internaliza-
tion is that each market is fragmented, since each MNE constitutes a
separate and independent system from other participants in the same
market. Thus, there are few if any intersectoral linkages with
internalization.
The internalization paradigm suggests that the MNE is the efficient
alternative to the lack of free trade.167 In other words, if the world were
characterized by free trade there would be no need for the MNE. How-
ever, since the underlying conditions for a perfect competitive model in
the goods and factor markets do not hold in the normal world, free trade
between nations is destroyed. The use of the MN-E and the FDI process
is then an efficient second-best response to the existence of market fail-
ure. In the normal Herscher-Ohlin world, location-specific endowments
lead to international trade. Under the internationalization paradigm,
however, firm specific endowments or advantages internal to the MNE,
together with industry specific factors, lead to FDI. These firm specific
advantages are the same as those described earlier as intangible assets.
The intangible assets hypothesis and the internalization theory both view
the exclusive possession of some proprietary knowledge, know-how, or
trade secrets as very important in the FDI process. They also consider
these assets to have the character of public goods and transactions in
them are characterized by market imperfections. These imperfections
relate to the industry specific factors.
The two theories provide different explanations of the FDI process
emerging from the same sources of market imperfections. The intangible
assets theory, its critics claim, ignores the costs associated with the crea-
tion of the firm-specific advantages. 168 Moreover, it predisposes one to
think of a single firm-specific asset, innovation, or endowment, in which
case leasing would be most appropriate. Consequently, the theory fails
to focus on the methods of the transmission of innovative capability
166 Id.
167 Rugman, supra note 161, at 366, 368.
168 See P. BUCKLEY & M. CAssoN, supra note 35, at 37-44; J. DUNNING, INT'L PROD., supra
note 37.
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which requires a set of efficient markets. FDI takes place under the in-
tangible assets theory to make some returns on a costless firm-specific
advantage. On the other hand, under the internalization theory, FDI is
motivated by the efficiency considerations of MNEs. Considerations that
induce them to attempt to own or control markets of their specific en-
dowments so that they can appropriate a fair return for their costs in
knowledge creation expenditures.
The market imperfections that may trigger internalization are sev-
eral, but can conveniently be categorized into two groups: (1) market
imperfections which may arise from exogenous government-induced inef-
ficiencies, and (2) market imperfections which arise from normal market
failure in the goods and factor markets. 169 Government-induced imper-
fections will normally arise from government intervention in the interna-
tional markets through tariffs and non-tariff barriers, controls, and
restrictions on international capital flows, foreign exchange regulations,
and discrepancies between corporate tax rates.170 These imperfections, it
is argued, provide an incentive for internalization at the international
level. For instance, exchange control restrictions or corporate tax differ-
entials would induce an MNE to shift its profits form one country to
another through its own internally-controlled transfer pricing system by
the use of a foreign subsidiary.
Similarly, several non-government market failures will provide the
incentive for internalization. For instance, imperfections may exist in the
intermediate goods markets where the transactions are characterized by
significant time lags without any efficient futures markets. Discrimina-
tory pricing may be required to exploit market power.171 There may also
be significant disparities in the bargaining power between buyers and sell-
ers of intangible assets. Finally, in the case of bilateral concentration of
market power, the costs of sanctions inherent in the bargain process cre-
ate some uncertainty and, therefore, may require some joint control or
ownership. Any or all of these market imperfections which might be
structural or cognitive would induce an MNE to replace these imperfec-
tions with its own internal efficient markets for these goods.
Given the advantages of internalization outlined above, MNEs will
internalize their international operations if and only if the benefits out-
weigh the costs of doing so." Of importance to the cost function of aninternalizing MNE are those associated with generating its firm specific
169 P. BUCKLEY & M. CASSON, supra note 35. See also Rugman, supra note 161, at 371.
170 P. BUCKLEY & M. CASSON, supra note 35, at 44.
171 Id. at 38.
172 Id. at 37-40.
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advantages described as "public goods." Internalization should be seen
as an attempt by the MNE to make some positive net returns on its
costly prior outlays in knowledge-generating investments. These costs
are not sunk costs. Internalization will also involve several other cost
which have to be minimized. First, internalization will increase the re-
source costs resulting from market fragmentation. Second, since interna-
tionalization might involve a monocentric or polycentric control system
of geographically-dispersed units of internalized operations, both the ad-
ministrative and communication costs of coordinating these units will
increase and, thereby, increase the general overhead costs. Finally, host
governments might also increase the costs of internalization by various
types of overt and covert discriminatory actions against foreign-owned or
-controlled subsidiaries. These types of politically-induced costs of for-
eign operations will be positively correlated to the political stability of
the host country. When these cost items, weighed against all the benefits,
are not prohibitive, internalization of foreign operations will take
place. 173
Internalization, its proponents assert, is a general theory of FDI
since it is eclectic and seeks to incorporate other theories of FDI as con-
sistent and complementary explanations of the FDI process. It is
claimed that internationalization incorporates profit maximization be-
havior in the real world of market imperfections-an element not consid-
ered by the neo-classical Herscher-Ohlin profit maximization theories. 174
As shown above, it incorporates and explains further the intangible assets
hypothesis. Furthermore, it also explains the industrial organization the-
ory as a complementary part of internalization. Oligopolistic market
structures, collusion, and barriers to entry all manifest certain imperfec-
tions in the external market which explain the desire for ownership and
control, thus internalization. 175  Finally, internalization incorporates
Raymond Vernon's product cycle hypothesis which explains FDI as be-
ing sequential and determined by the life cycle of the product: innova-
tion, spread, maturity, and senescence. 176  FDI takes place at the
173 Id. at 44.
174 See Rugman, supra note 161, at 371-73, and J. DUNNING, INT'L PROD., supra note 37.
175 See Rugman, supra note 161, at 371-73, and J. DUNNING, INT'L PROD., supra note 37.
176 The product cycle hypothesis was one of the most important explanations of the FDI process
of United States manufacturing enterprises. It has, however, been partially rejected by its author
and other economists as an important explanation of FDI. See Vernon, International Investment
and International Trade in the Product Cycle, 80 QUART. J. ECON. 190 (1966). For Vernon's recon-
sideration of the product cycle hypothesis, see Vernon, The Product Cycle Hypothesis in a New Inter-
national Environment, 41 OxF. BULL. ECON. STATIST. 255 (1979). For a critic's view of it, see
Giddy, The Demise of the Product Cycle Model in International Business, 13 COLUM. J. WORLD BUs.
90 (1978).
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maturity stage of the product. The connection between internalization
and the product cycle hypothesis is the initial motivation for research
and knowledge creation which lie at the center of internalization. Once
the initial outlays in and motivation behind R & D are explained, every-
thing about the product cycle hypothesis follows. 177
A. Incentive Policy Implications
A discussion of the incentive policy implications of the internaliza-
tion theory requires an understanding of the importance of this theory to
the definition of the MNE adopted in this study. According to the the-
ory, the MNE is motivated by the desire for internal operational effi-
ciency which can more easily be achieved through ownership and
control. As such, the internalization theory helps to explain why, func-
tionally, the MNE constitutes a multinational system. The MNE is more
like an organism responding to various internal and external stimuli
given certain internal capabilities. It seems to function best when it is
within an environment where it controls its operations. Thus, the theory
seems to explain the reasons for the preference of MNEs for shuttling
their resources within their systems. It also explains the desire of MNEs
to create options and flexibility so that they can respond to various eco-
nomic stimuli internationally. In addition, it offers important insights
into transfer pricing and market fragmentation.
One of the benefits to be derived from MNE internal control systems
is the ability to set prices for transactions or to allocate costs within the
system without reference to prevailing prices or cost structures. How-
ever, the MNE system represents market fragmentation. Each individual
MNE constitutes a separate internal market with very little or no inte-
gration with others within the same industry. Thus, an industry in a host
country, such as the aluminum industry in Ghana, could be fragmented
along oligopolistic lines and yet would be connected in an undesirable
way with other countries within the MNE system. The internal opera-
tional dynamism of MNEs explains the concerns of several home and
host countries over the effects of MNEs' activities on national economic
policies and development. Therefore, several questions arise as to the
appropriate host country policies towards FDI.
An important factor in determining the possible policy prescriptions
of the internalization theory is the issue of costs and benefits. Specifl-
cally, how are the costs and benefits from MNE operations distributed?
According to the theory there are two types of costs and benefits involved
177 See Rugman, supra note 161, at 371-75.
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in internalization: 1) private costs and benefits relating to the firm,
1 78
and 2) social costs and benefits relating to the national welfare implica-
tions of MNE operations.1 79 FDI takes place when the benefits to the
MNE outweigh the costs.
The fact that it is beneficial for the MNE to internalize does not
necessarily mean that the host country or society at large benefits from
the operations of the MNE. The operational costs of MNEs might un-
derstate the social costs. Therefore, the private benefits might exceed the
social benefits. In an explanation of the policy implications of the MNE,
Mark Casson suggests that, in several areas, MNEs might be benefiting
more than host governments since the private benefits exceed the social
benefits. 80 In this respect Casson made the startling assertion that there
might be too much FDI in the world.18 In his view, that MNEs benefit
more than governments from internalizing their operations implies that
there could have been more arms-length licensing arrangements, presum-
ably between MNEs and local licensees. In fact, he suggests that host
governments should improve the external market environment to make
licensing easier by providing better protection to owners of
technology. 
1 82
Taken to its logical conclusion, the argument advanced above sug-
gests that host governments should not encourage FDI. In fact, they
should discourage it. Any incentives that would increase internalization
would be misplaced on the basis of the current costs and benefits in-
volved. However, an incentive policy depends upon the validity of the
assertion that there might be too much FDI. It has been shown that very
little of the FDI goes to the poorest of the developing countries. Even
among the richer of the developing countries there is a concentration of
FDI in the richest of them. Taken as a whole, the developing countries
have continued to attract only a small fraction of the FDI in the world,
accounting on the average for only one-third of the total flows of FDI
between 1960 and 1979.83 Therefore, it is doubtful whether, as a general
statement, Casson's suggestion is applicable to several developing coun-
178 See generally J. DUNNING, INT'L PROD., supra note 37; P. BUCKLEY & M. CASSON, supra
note 35; M. CASSON, supra note 65; Giddy, supra note 176. See also Gamier, Context and Decision
Making Autonomy in Foreign Affiliates of U.S. Multinational Corporations, 25 ACAD. MGMT. J. 893
(1982) (an interesting article that bears on the internalization theory).
179 See J. DUNNING, INT'L PROD., supra note 37, at 33.
180 M. CASSON, supra note 65, at 83.
181 Iae at 84.
182 Id at 85.
183 Id at 50, 89-91.
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tries. What Casson has uncovered is a distribution problem not unique
to FDI.
These countries seem to recognize the distribution problem and the
need for improved relations in arms-length technology transfer transac-
tions. Yet it is doubtful whether the distribution problem is an out-
growth of the insufficient number of licensing contracts. It might also be
explainable by the industrial traits and the general environment of the
MNE. Increasing the number of licensing contracts might have very lit-
tle practical utility to host countries without the necessary local en-
trepreneurial group to engage in licensing operations. Moreover, there is
an implicit assumption that licensing will improve the host country's tax
revenue picture. This does not follow. Any increased protection to in-
dustrial property as suggested by Casson might increase the market im-
perfections and the disparities in bargaining power between licensors and
licensees, thereby encouraging oppressive terms. For several host devel-
oping countries, the question still remains as to how to entice and chan-
nel sufficient amounts of FDI for their economic development.
L Tax Incentive Policy Implications
It is useful to examine the nature of the conditions for FDI to see
whether they are susceptible to inducement policies. It should be noted
that the policy discussion of the intangible assets hypothesis and the in-
dustrial organization theories are relevant since they also relate to the
same market imperfections discussed here. The internalization theory
draws a distinction between two market imperfections that explain
FDI-those that are germane to market failure and those that are in-
duced by government policies. Government-induced imperfections
would include tariff barriers, tax rate differentials, and exchange restric-
tions. If either or both of these sets of imperfections exist, the necessary
incentive for FDI operations will exist.
It is, once again, possible to have redundancy and costly tax incen-
tive policies. If market failure exists, then the government-induced im-
perfections need not be generated. If market failure does not exist, then
tariff and non-tariff barriers might provide the necessary incentive for
defensive investments, thereby making tax incentives redundant under
those circumstances."8 4 The theory also asserts that the world is imper-
fect and that the information markets are almost always imperfect,
thereby suggesting that the necessary conditions for FDI exist through
184 See generally Horst, Optimal Behavior, supra note 32; Mundell, supra note 91.
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the malfunctioning of the markets. Hence, host governments need not
generate more imperfections, particularly in the form of tax incentives.
The argument against government-induced market imperfections is
even stronger given that they generally tend to increase the social costs of
FDI which might not be compensated for in the distribution of MNE
generated wealth. The efficacy of tax incentives might be in doubt for
other reasons. One of the main arguments of the internalization theory is
the possibility that the MNE may engage in market fragmentation
whereby it closes its internal markets to outsiders. Through this process,
it can erect some barriers to entry and engage in transfer pricing to take
advantage of tax rate differentials between countries. The importance of
transfer pricing as an incentive for sourcing investments in several indus-
trializing countries cannot be doubted from the previous discusison of
the MNE system. The extent to which this will continue to be an incen-
tive for FDI will depend on the response of host countries to transfer
pricing.
There appears to be greater host country awareness of the problems
of transfer pricing and the need to control intra-firm transactions. Sev-
eral countries have sought to regulate such transactions in technology
transfer and other commodities trade. 85 However, the efficacy (but not
the desirability) of such regulations is in doubt. Mark Casson suggests
that one of the best policies towards redressing the distribution problem
in FDI requires tightening up host countries' regulations on transfer
pricing so as to close all loopholes and effectively enforce the regula-
tions. 86 This would eliminate tax differentials and price manipulation as
an incentive for FDI. It would also increase the social benefits to the
host country.
With better host country accounting controls and better information
on prices and costing practices, the efficacy of tax incentives as an en-
couragement for related party transactions is very doubtful. This is par-
ticularly so in industrialized countries. Even in the case of developing
countries, the sensitivity of host governments to accounting malpractices
is such that transfer pricing will most likely not continue be a very strong
incentive in the FDI process.
2. Control as an Incentive
Although tax incentives might not appeal to the policy analyst
under this theory, other policy instruments are available. First among
these is the issue of control. Like the industrial organization theory, in-
185 UNCTC, SALIENT FEATURES, supra note 23, at 39. See also Rosenn, supra note 143.
186 See M. CAssoN, supra note 65.
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ternalization centers around the desire to control the operations of the
firms. As explained earlier, if the basic conditions for internalization
generally exist, then the question is whether host governments should
permit and encourage ownership structures that would place the locus of
control both dejure or defacto in the MNE. An extensive analysis of the
issue of control as a possible incentive policy under the industrial organi-
zation theory has already been developed. Several of the arguments ad-
vanced there are equally applicable here. However, one should note the
difference between the two theories. The industrial organization theory
raises several questions about economic distortions, the loss of policy au-
tonomy, or denationalization that might arise from MNE control over
FDI. The internalization theory seems to associate MNE control with
efficiency. Therefore, it fails to recognize several of the problems inher-
ent in the political economy of the MNE and FDI. Under this theory,
internalization raises only distribution problems, not issues relating to
the path of industrialization. Internalization does not even raise ques-
tions about the choice of technique as a related question of ownership
and control. Thus, for the host governments, control over operations is
not as important as controlling prices within the internal markets to
eliminate transfer pricing and market fragmentation.
The implication is that foreign ownership legislation could be an in-
centive for FDI. Local ownership and control is not essential as long as
foreign ownership and control is accompanied by the appropriate policies
resulting in distributive equities in the private sector and social benefits
from FDI. Though this argument is similar to others advanced under
the industrial organization theory, it should be stressed that price-related
solutions alone cannot correct the problems of market fragmentation and
inappropriate technology. First, the host government policies should in-
clude prescribed technology and local content requirements for various
FDI activities particularly in manufacturing. This type of policy would
tend to generate the use of appropriate technology and the necessary in-
tersectoral linkages. Then, policies controlling intra-firm prices would
ensure that the internal markets of the MNE are open and the prices of
their transactions with third parties are fair. Hence, there would be a
policy of encouraging FDI through foreign ownership and control stat-
utes, but ensuring that such ownership and control does not result in
monopoly profits, manipulation of host countries, or denationalization.
3. Other Policy Implications
Besides the issue of control, there are other possible policy instru-
ments relating to costs associated with the political environment in the
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host country. Internalization may involve costs associated with host
government's discriminatory practices against foreign firms. It may also
involve costs related to political instability and uncertainty. These may,
in turn, induce the firm to underinvest in the collection of information
about the host country's environment, making investment decisions diffi-
cult. It might even involve costs related to the regulatory functions of
the host government.
Under these circumstances, it is possible to introduce policies to en-
courage FDI subject to the issue of distribution. For example, the host
country might reduce or eliminate any discriminatory practices against
foreign firms. It may also eliminate irrelevant regulatory functions and
adopt the appropriate policies towards controllable political instability.
The host government might even subsidize the search costs involved in
FDI by investing in information gathering and dissemination. Though
these cost reduction policies alone will not act as incentives for internal-
ization, they are nevertheless important in the internalization calculus.
Together with the MNE-related costs, they constitute sufficient, but not
necessary, conditions for internalization. Here again cost-related policies
re-emerge as possible incentive instruments, as opposed to the current
emphasis on tax reductions.
Finally, of crucial importance to the internalization theory is the
foreign economic policies of a host country. The MNE, according to this
theory, thrives on a market environment that permits the MNE's func-
tional dynamism and its ability to shuttle resources between various
points within its system. This suggests quite strongly that a host country
bent on attracting FDI must adapt its foreign economic policies to re-
spond to these factors. To create the appropriate business and economic
environment for FDI, its economic policies must include free trade and
free enterprise. Nonetheless, since the theory was designed for an imper-
fect world, the least that would be required of a host country is a specific
policy that permits the MNE to engage in its distinctive behavior even if
the general policy is one of restriction.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although tax incentives have remained significant policy instru-
ments for attracting FDI, they have been largely ineffective. It was the
objective of this article to develop alternative policies for encouraging
FDI based upon different theories of the MINE. Such a task could not be
carried without a thorough understanding of the MNE.
If functional dynamism, operational flexibility, and a "foot-loose"
mentality in the use of its financial, human, technological, and other re-
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sources are the hallmarks of the distinctive behavior and characteristic
attributes of the MNE, then a host country determined to attract signifi-
cant amounts of MNE investments must first develop a sophisticated un-
derstanding of the MNE system. This understanding will permit host
countries to develop a more comprehensive and consistent policy to-
wards the MNE and its investments. This is of fundamental importance
when one considers that the MNE can sometimes evoke an adverse reac-
tion even among those who seek to entice FDI.
Consistent and meaningful policies require, in addition, some theo-
retical basis. In the past, various theories of the MNE were canvassed as
alternative and competing explanations of the MNE and the FDI pro-
cess. This article has explored two such theories: the intangible assets
hypothesis and the industrial organization theory. What is interesting
about them is their similarity. For a host country trying to develop effec-
tive policies for attracting FDI, it is neither desirable nor advisable to
treat theories of the MNE as alternatives. As suggested by the interna-
tionalization theory, an eclectic approach is required. The MNE and its
environment constitute a very complex phenomenon requiring such an
eclectic approach for the development of appropriate host country's poli-
cies. For these reasons, the policy prescriptions canvassed in this article
should be seen as complementary to each other.
Three major areas of incentive policies were explored in this article:
technology, labor, and ownership and control. Since FDI generally con-
stitutes a bundle of resources, capital, technology, and labor, an effective
way to develop policies for encouraging FDI is to evolve separate but
complementary policies towards each component of the FDI bundle of
resources. One such policy would relate to the technology that enters the
MNE system. The technology chosen by the MNE for a particular FDI
might well suit the needs for the MNE's system but not those of the host
country. The technology and its products might be inappropriate not
because of the level of development of the host country, but because they
do not fit into the host country's industrial policies nor foster certain
policy objectives in either the short or long run. Thus, given certain host
country industrialization policies, some specific technology transfer in-
centive policies can be adopted to ensure the appropriate technology in
FDI. Suppose the host country is determined to develop a complex in-
dustry, that would require complex technology and the appropriate cor-
responding technology transfer policy. The host country may subsidize
the cost of the required complex technology. It may subsidize the train-
ing of the required skilled local labor for such technology or encourage
the efficiency of labor. It may also stabilize the rental rates for technol-
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ogy transfer. To encourage local adaptation, R & D and the develop-
ment of significant local capability in a particular industry, the host
country may subsidize R & D and technology that fits the adaptation
needs through direct grants. It may also subsidize and actively partici-
pate in the training of researchers. In the medium- and long-term, these
incentives could have a significant and positive impact on attracting FDI.
Though the host country can encourage the use of the appropriate
MNE-owned technology in the FDI process, there appears to be even a
more fundamental policy for technology. Since FDI generally involves
the use of MNE-owned technology developed through R & D, it should
be possible for host countries to influence the initial development of spe-
cific appropriate technology. This could be achieved through joint re-
search ventures between MNEs and host governments. It could involve
just one MNE and a host government, or several MNEs and several host
countries with similar technology and FDI needs. The rights of the par-
ties and the form of host country involvement would all be a matter of
contract.
Given the technology input policies, the host government can then
develop other complementary labor policies to enhance its total incentive
package. It is generally believed that cheap labor policies are required to
entice FDI. However, the evidence seems to suggest that the efficacy of
cheap labor policies might depend on several factors including, in partic-
ular, the skills and efficiency of labor. Therefore, the appropriate labor
policies for attracting FDI must be task directed. Various industries re-
quire various forms of labor input. Since the approach examined here
calls for industry-specific policies within a coherent general industrial
policy, different labor policies might be appropriate for various indus-
tries. For instance, labor policies may be directed at labor costs, its effi-
ciency, the acquisition of skills, or any other factor depending upon the
industry, the labor situation, and the host government's objectives.
Whatever policies are adopted, the host country should be sensitive to
and develop complementary policies to address the issue of distributive
equities and ensure that the burden of industrialization is not borne by
labor alone.
Ownership and control over foreign operations, some theories have
stressed, go to the very root of the motivation of the MNEs to invest
abroad. If that is the case, then logic demands that any policy designed
to entice the MNE to invest abroad must address the question of owner-
ship and control within the context of a host country's industrial policy,
its level of technical competence, and the strategic objectives of MNEs.
The question of who owns and manages the resources in a particular
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industry might be irrelevant, important, or even crucial to the attainment
of certain host country's objectives. On the other hand, ownership and
control might be crucial to the MNE for a specific FDI or an aspect of it,
but not for other types of FDI. A blanket policy approach could lump
together all forms of FDI under the same ownership and control policies.
However, that is likely to be ineffective. An approach that recognizes the
need for discriminatory policies towards the issue of ownership and con-
trol is required. Ownership and control could be used as incentives for
FDI where they are crucial to either or both the host country and the
MNE. The MNE has over the years demonstrated a remarkable adapta-
bility to its environment. Ownership and control policies that are suffi-
ciently responsible to the MNE environment, its strategic goals, and
combined with well-established international contract forms such as joint
ventures, production sharing agreements, service contracts, and fade-out
agreements, might be an effective way to entice FDI. For several host
countries, new and more dynamic arrangements could be even more ef-
fective in enticing FDI. However, given the political economy of the
MNE and its tendency to fragment markets, the ownership and control
policies, should, when appropriate, include local content and intra-firm
pricing policies to minimize the negative impact of the MNE system on
distribution and intersectoral linkages.
In addition to these policy options, host countries may consider in-
formation gathering and dissemination on FDI opportunities. They may
consider subsidizing research costs, improving controllable political
risks, and providing an adequate regime of industrial property protection
and enforcement.
Finally, it is important to note that the mere passage of incentive
statutes is hardly sufficient to encourage significant amounts of FDI.
Apart from such laws and policies being coherent and task-oriented, an
active participation of the host government is important. Whatever the
host country does, it should keep in mind the nature of the MNE system.
It must also understand the characteristic attributes of the MNE, its po-
litico-economic implications, and the subsequent reaction that the MNE
sometimes evokes. It would appear that the more permissive the host
country's economic environment is, the better the climate for FDI. Even
where the host country is involved in an active management of its econ-
omy, specific policies could still create the appropriate climate for FDI.
